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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
Purpose
The objective of this thesis is to develop a set of criteria for
evaluating community economic development (CED) enterprise projects, which
can be characterized as a unique blending of both public and private inves-
tment monies in ventures with both social and economic goals. We will
use two case studies from the Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs
(DCA) Community Enterprise Projects program as representative examples of
CED: The Brightwood Corporation, a Local Development Corporation located
in Springfield which has developed a shopping center and is involved in
many other projects, and The Montachusetts Opportunity Council Furniture
Rehabilitation Project (Hereinafter referred to as MOC), a social service
community action agency (CAA or often called CAP) which operates a furni-
ture rehab shop in Fitchburg, Massachusetts. There is much yet to be
learned and tested about the utility of these community economic develop-
ment activities, as many agencies and community organizations view enter-
prise development as one means to achieving several objectives--job
creation, service provision, community development, and neighborhood
preservation and stabilization, to name a few. Our self-appointed task,
then, is to develop a set of both qualitative and quantitative measures
that can be used to determine project feasibility and to evaluate these
two case studies in light of these criteria in order to make some judge-
ments or inferences about the viability of community enterprise--particul-
arly of the type studied.
Community Economic Development: A Definition and a Rationale
Community economic development has been defined as "the support of
groups of producers or consumers acting collectively, with social benefit
and institutional change a more important objective of development than
2private profit.' As opposed to traditional capitalist goals of private
ownership and profit maximization, CED can help create a strong economic
base for a community by reversing the outflow of cash payments and maximi-
zing investment dollars and other resources that flow in. CED can also be
characterized as public economic decision making that generally counters
prevailing private market forces that encourage disinvestment in a commu-
nity when investment becomes no longer profitable. Given the assumptions
that the "poor will continue to exist, that political and economic power
are inextricably linked, and that power can be created through organized
institutions which wield power in the form of money and votes, etc.," 2
public programs creating 3CED activities have attempted to:
(a) increase opportunities for the poor and powerless to participate
in a variety of areas of economic life;
(b) enhance the economic status of low-income persons by building
community institutions and mechanisms independent of government
funding and political largesse;
(c) increase participation of the poor and minorities as owners,
entrepreneurs--with rewards of independence and economic self-
sufficiency; -
(d) build institutions responsive to the collective wishes of a
community; with the long-run goal of achieving economic parity
for the poor and minorities with the majority of Americans.
Specific milestones to be achieved by this activity included: increased
income and more and better employment opportunities for community resi-
dents; participation in the ownership and management of resident-controlled
firms; and the promotion of the community self-sufficiency concept.
CED also implies collective action, community responsibility, and
cooperative self-help to residents of economically depressed areas. The
Community Development Corporation (CDC)--a legal entity created to carry
out community-based economic development--often exemplifies a form of
"people's capitalism" 4 by selling voting stock in an individual enterprise
3within a community. Geoffrey Faux 5 offers the following definition for the
CDC:
The term "community development corporation" is used to identify
organizations created and controlled by people living in impover-
ished areas for the purpose of planning, stimulating, financing,
and, when necessary, owning and operating businesses that will
provide employme'nt income and a better life for the residents of
these areas.
Other models of community economic development include 1) Local Develop-
ment Corporations - business development entities to assist local merchants
establish new or expand existing businesses; 2) Employee's Stock Ownership
Trusts (ESOTs) where employees own the means of production, and in some
cases make the managerial decisions as well as respond to the social goals
of the community; 3) Communiti Action Agencies (CAAs), non-profit social
service agencies that may control subsidiary CDCs, whose ventures can
channel profits into social services; 4) non-profit housing development
corporations for the development of quality, low-cost housing for the
elderly and low-income families; and 5) consumers' cooperatives, organizations
which encourage local production and are controlled by the members who
patronize the cooperative's business.
Thesis Structure
In order to achieve the objectives of this thesis, we recognize the
necessity for placing this activity in context by relating some historical
background that will be useful in understanding the evolution of the idea
of community economic development. How CED evolved then relates directly
to the goals and objectives for which this activity occurs and can assist
us in determining whether or not these activities are worthy of the resources
allotted them. Thus, in Chapter two, we deal with a brief history of CED
(on the national, state and local levels) and its evolution from many other
4similar concepts proposed for poor and minority participation in the economic
mainstream. In Chapter three, we establish the need for some basis to judge
the possible dffectiveness of CED activities. We therefore set forth our
methodology for evaluating CED enterprises for use by agencies and community
organizations seeking to maximum the yield on their investment dollar in
terms of their rate of return in social, economic or political benefits.
Developed here are criteria for evaluation of CED enterprises, the type of
data necessary for such an evaluation and possible sources of data. An
explanation of our case study approach will follow and will detail how and
why the two particular cases were chosen. Following the two descriptive
case studies in Chapters four and five, a Synthesis in Chapter six will
bring all the social and economic criteria together in "matrices of
evaluation" which will then be analyzed in greater detail: the enterprise's
characteristics, strengths, weaknesses, and the utility of the venture to
the community at large, the project participant, and the society. A last
section will formulate conclusions based on an interesting discovery we made
while writing this paper which has to do with a typology of organizations
involved in economic development--what seems to work best with organizations
having certain sets of characteristics and conditions--all of which would
be useful to agencies interested in working with community groups or
organizations considering or already involved in community enterprise.
CHAPTER 2:
THE CONTEXT:
A Brief History
5Many events on the national, state, and local levels and the result-
ant development of statutes, agencies, and legal entities to support
community economic development can be traced back to the early and mid-1960s,
when recognition of vast socio-economic inequities in our urban ghetto
areas exploded into widespread unrest. The solutions which resulted dealt
with social problems as well as attempts to broaden and improve or even
create an economic base for these chronically depressed areas.
Depending upon a particular.agency's perception of "the problem," a
variety of training, manpower and community development programs appeared
on the national scene:6 Federal legislation initially enacted in 1962
called the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) authorized manpower
services and was initially used to retrain persons possessing obsolete
skills and later redirected to emphasize training for disadvantaged persons
and youth. In 1964, Congress authorized the Office of Economic Opportunity
and mandated that it manage antipoverty programs, with the avowed purpose
of eliminating poverty by opening to everyone the opportunity for "educa-
tion, training, work, decency and dignity." With the War On Poverty as
official national policy and well underway, it-was soon learned that
supportive social services and other sets of rights were useless without
the recognition that inequities in the economic system had to be corrected
before any deprived groups could gain self-sufficiency and participation
in the so-called free enterprise system. This recognition culminated in
December, 1966, with Title I of the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, which
was formally amended to include, under Part D, provisions to create
Federally-subsidized projects for depressed inner-city areas. The program
was calle, the Special Impact Program (SIP). The mandate of the SIP
program is to provide assistance to community development corporations
(CDCs) and other organizations that 1) "are directed to the solution of
6the critical problems existing in particular communities or neighborhoods-;
and 2) are of sufficient size, scope and duration to have an appreciable
impact...in arresting tendencies toward dependency, chronic unemployment,
and.community deterioration. . ." 7
By 1966, the Manpower Development and Training ACT (MDTA), the Economic
Opportunity Act, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had introduced an
institutional and on-the-job skills training program for unemployed
persons of all ages, a residential vocational skills program for youth,
separate work experience programs for in- and out-of-school youth and for
the adult poor, a community action program, and the beginnings of efforts
to enforce equal opportunity in employment. Other programs created to
provide job training and skills enrichment opportunities to the under-
privileged citizens of the country included the Work Incentive Program,
the Neighborhood Youth Corps, the Concentrated Employment Program,
Operation Mainstream, Public Service Careers, New Careers, and various
others. Each of these programs were designed to attack specific problems
based on an agency's assumptions relating to labor market and human capital
deficiencies and ways they choose to deal with such specific deficiencies.
Another forerunner of contemporary community-based economic develop-
ment was "black capitalism," which represents a strategy for minority
participation in the economic mainstream. This concept, embraced in 1966
and 1967 by black power leaders, politicians, and the corporate community,
involved such goals as black ownership from which would stem pride, jobs,
and opportunity and power. Devices to assist the minority entrepreneur
with debt financing, technical assistance, and equity capital included
the Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE), Minority Enterprise
Small Business Investment Companies (MESBICs) and the Small Business
Administration (SBA). Although quite popular initially, subsequent
7evaluations noted that efforts at developing successful black businesses
were hampered by imposing burdens of debt financing and service upon these
fledgling firms, inadequate equity investment capital, and the lack of hard
business skills. There have been recent encouraging gains in CDC-related
minority business enterprise, however; and trends show decreased failure
rates for these minority businessmen who are overcoming the burdens of
excessive debt financing and inadequate equity capital and are learning to
use the available programs to package ventures with strong survival and
growth capabilities.
Efforts at increased self-help and economic development for the poor
were consistently battled on the national scene. Title VII, primary funding
for CDCs, was always in jeopardy of being "porkbarrelled" by politicians
looking for projects with high visibility. In addition, due to reces-
sionary inflation during the period of 1972 through 1974 and the policies
of the Nixon administration, there was a period of retrenchment for many
social service and economic development programs; what saved many programs
from total -elimination was a recalcitrant and irritated democratic Congress
who utilized their legislative authority to block these attempts. Despite
the Ford Administration efforts to cut the CSA budget (from which community
economic development funds come) in 1975, the fiscal year 1976 CSA package
included an additional $7.5 million for community development corporations
and an increase to $46.5 million (from $39 million) for community economic
development. 9 The mood through the mid-70's has not been positive for
community economic development, but there may now be changes for the better
with the new administration, which has declared itself opern for suggestions,
new programs, and ideas.
National concepts and activities relating to enterprise development
as a means toward job creation have filtered down to the state level where
8the recognition was apparent that the needed capital and technical resources
for development could be appliea to communities as well as agencies in the
state who service poverty-striken communities in economically depressed
areas.
State Activities
The first community economic development conference took place in
Massachusetts in April of 1975 and signaled the beginning of a new aware-
ness on the part of the Commonwealth: "For too long we have considered
the problems of poverty and economic development as separate problems to
be thought about independently and to be dealt with by different agencies,"ao
emphasized Lieutenant Governor Thomas P. O'Neill, III. "Too often we discuss
economic development with the business community while we discuss poverty
with the social workers." The conference, first of its kind in any state,
brought together nearly 150 practitioners and others in a forum designed
to approach the problems of ;.overty and economic development from a common
perspective. Common areas and problems of concern were exchanged--scarce
capital, indifferent bureaucracies, lack of cooperation from government
agencies, and identification of appropriate sources of funding. What
resulted from this and other meetings, conferences and seminars was a
concentrated effort on the part of the state to support legislation, develop-
ment entities and other mechanisms to promote community economic development
as a viable job creation effort across the state. Efforts have resulted in
the establishment of such entities, some of which are listed as follows:
- Community Development Finance Corporation (CDFC), an independent public
agency created in December of 1975 and financed through $10 million of
general obligation bonds, represents the largest investment in community
economic development in the state of Massachusetts. The new corporation
9will, through a nine-member board, make investments in CDC ventures,
accepting lower rates of return and higher-risk investments--particularly
in economically depressed areas where a project may have the potential
to create permanent, reasonably well-paying jobs in poor communities
and increase local capital ownership.
- Mass Local Initiative Program and Local Economic Action Projects (LIP and
LEAP are patterned after the Canadian employment creation models. LIP,
a six-month pro-gram which began in July of 1976, permits the local
community or individuals to initiate and sponsor employment creating
projects that provide previously unavailable goods or services or utilize
untapped resources. The LEAP program, initiated by program officials,
creates employment alternatives for the chronically unemployed by either
1) increasing the participants' employability ("preparation" projects)
or 2) providing good prospects for self-sustaining ventures that would
provide permanent employment ("retention" projects). This program is
under further study and research.
- New England Regional Commission (NERCOM), a regional organization estab-
lished in 1965 and comprised of organizational representatives from
each state has a mandate to develop, coordinate, and implement plans
and programs to further the economic well-being of New England region
residents. It leverages its monies against those of other public and
private sector grant-making entities to optimize the effectiveness of
these monies.
- The Economic Development Projects Coordination Committee (EDPCC)--created
in 1975--is composed of persons whose agencies administer state funding
programs. This group has established a project review and coordination
process. Meeting regularly to discuss economic development issues on the
state level, this committee decides on the level of support for various
10
projects, often issuing RFP's.
- Technology Development Corporation (TDC), a private, non-profit corpora-
tion assists in new product enterprise development using various levels
and scales of technology, marketing, and the provision of technical
assistance where necessary. Under contract to the Lynn CAP, they have
assisted in the product design, testing and market development of a new
energy-saving device called a WindOSeal.
DCA's entry in community economic development was partly a result of
The Division of Social and Economic Opportunity participation on the
Economic Development Projects Committee and the national and statewide
trends toward enterprise development as a means to job creation. Early
in 1976, this Committe began meeting to discuss items such as specifi:
project review and rating criteria, and coordination of the various state
economic development funding programs administered by members of the
Committee. Out of this process came a series of RFP's from the various
agencies for economic development projects across the state. The intent
of the series of RFP's was to maximize the consolidation of grants by the
various economic development projects in the state to further insure their
viability. DCA's Division of Social and Economic Opportunity then sponsored
an RFP for Community Enterprise Projects as a part of this effort. The
funding available, $69,000, represented unexpended federal funds available
to the Division. Project goals related to supporting jobs and providing
for creative demonstration projects. The demand for seed money for such
projects was evidenceiby the number of requests and- by letters of support
and phone calls received from legislators, local officials and other
supportive commnunity agencies. Also, economic development is a top priority
of the current state administration.
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Two community enterprises from the DCA program are evaluated in case
study form in Chapters four and five of this thesis. Since DCA is
attempting to begin another Community Enterprise Projects program year
with $300,000 of Economic Development Administration (EDA) monies, the
results of this evaluation may be of particular importance in ascertaining
the projects that are worthy of the agency's support.
1 12
CAAs and CDCs: A Controversy
We would like to submit for your examination an interesting diversion
on the' role of CAAs and CDCs in community economic development, which,
although not central to the focus of this document, bears some relation-
ship to the typology of organizations involved in CED and has major
implications for the success or failure of an enterprise given its orien-
tation, mission, and characteristics. This section presumes two major
models of CED (there are others): CDCs--the organizational entity first
recognized by the government as the development structure designated to
carry out economic development activities for urban and rural depressed
areas--and CAAs, community action agencies--whose activities are primarily
social service delivery for the poor but who are likely to serve the same
target population as the CDC. These organizational proponents of community
economic development are sometimes not too subtly involved in orgaaizational
and turf disputes over CED activities. The primary distinctions of the two
organizational types are institutional arrangements and goals and object-
tives; the bone of contention, as usual, involves scarce resources and
their allocation among competing agencies. The confrontation never becomes
violent or too upsetting--it just seethes silently for the most part, but
sometimes surfaces and is manifest in deep-rooted resentment and subtle
attempts to discredit the competing organizations or agencies.
Part of the problem lies in the confusing layers of federal bureaucra-
cies which promulgate a plethora of rules and regulations for a variety of
agencies some with vastly different and others with similar missions. Then
the myriad number of programs emanating from these agencies--some aimed at
the same target population--often demonstrate program duplicity and overlap
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yet are administered by different bureaucracies, each with its own set of
constituent agencies. One recent example is an RFP issued by CSA--geared
to its constituent groups--for a rural home repair program. In attempting
to respond to this request and demonstrate the required "mobilization of
resources," one state attempted to obtain a letter of support and a
commitment to coordinate activities from its local HUD office. One official
declined to write such a letter because he felt that it was not necessarily
good for "agencies to be supporting each other's proposals and activities."
Implicit in his comments were the -undercurrents of that old turf problem:
The CSA program represented an attempt to break into rural housing - a new
programmatic area for CSA - which is primarily a HUD responsibility; also the
CSA proposed program was mildly duplicative of the Section 8 and other
federal and state home rehab/repair programs--although it is the first program
specifically targeted for low-income persons living in rural areas.
Another major problem and excellent example is the original OEO's
limited definition of economic development, and its limited involvement
through the administration of the Special Impact Program specifically
through CDCs. By Congressional mandate, the Office of Economic Development
administers the funds designed to foster economic development activity in
urban.and rural depressed areas through CDCs but not legislatively to the
exclusion of CAAs. Therefore, an element of competition has been created
between two types of organizations with somewhat of the same mission--helping
the poor--but with a slightly different modus operandi. Instead of the
government insisting (through the promulgation of its rules and regulations,
for instance) on cooperation and actively encouraging that process through
the setting up of various mechanisms likely to accomplish that purpose, by
neglecting the situation, it has been allcwed to fester and essentially the
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two groups have, in some instances, become polarized, with each carving out
their own turf and declaring itself "ruler" and daring anyone else to enter
and attempt to provide services. "CAAs often are convinced of an anti-CAA
bias because of the OED policy of funding CDCs directly, rather than as
delegate agencies of CAAs and in OED's demand that the CDC boards be indepen-
dent of the CAA (only minimal board overlap is permitted.)". Occasionally,
where the feds insist on collaboration or cooperation, organizations will
meet-and work out inter-agency agreements, but this is the exception rather
than the rule.
To further complicate the funding allocation picture, CAPS would prefer
their own source of funds for economic development activities rather than
competing for those of CDCs. There is also an aversion among some CAAs to
forming subsidiary CDCs, due to what they feel is the lack of control factor
The CAPs are not completely aware of complex legal structures that would
have to be created to allow for an umbrella non-profit corporation, for
instance, to have maximum control over a subsidiary CDC's operations. The
fear is that creating a CDC which is eligible for massive public and
private funds can wield an enormous amount of power and gain a greater degree
of control in the community than the CAP itself due to its access to and
ability to create jobs. In a sense, then, the CAP agencies who are adverse
to starting or coordinating with CDCs may fear the loss of their constituen-
cies to an entity that can far better demonstrate tangible results in impro-
ving the residents' economic well-being.
The argument concerning under whose domain economic development activity
should fall still rages on the national scene. -CDC advocates are suspicious
of CAP motives for involvement in economic development activity; they wonder
whether CAPs are just seeking quick profits for service-oriented programs;
15
they are additionally concerned that CAA-run enterprises tend to be "Mom-
and Pop-type" operations--projects for which goals are short-run in nature
and which impact direct job creation only minimally. In question is the
CAA's "capacity, potential, commitment and understanding of community econ-
omic development as opposed to entrepreneurial business development." 12
CDCs see the need for a separate legal entity with its own resource and res-
ident base for community economic development activity. They feel the
Board (as well as staff) must have strong economic development expertise and
establish ties and a businesslike reputation with private sector organi-
zations and government agencies that service businesses.
CAAs, however, see economic development activity as a complementary
and supportive strategy to their social service operations: It can serve
the immediate needs of the poor by increasing their cash flow and it may
underwrite new or extended CAA program efforts. Besides the other broad
benefits of community action through economic development (neighborhood
commercial revitalization, building independence, an economic base, stren-
gthening political clout, etc.), CAAs feel they should control the majority
of programs for the poor so as to maintain the credibility necessary for
effective and vital advocacy. Additionally they perceive themselves in a
position of comparative advantage; because of their survival struggles,
CAAs have had to consolidate efforts in the face of dwindling funds, they
thus claim to have access to and capability to mobilize local resources for
use in economic development activities.
Another most compelling concern deals with dilution of organizational
goals and objectives. Even some CAAs have reservations about the dilution
of CAA purpose through redirected energies and efforts in community economic
development. They feel community enterprise to be challenging and exciting,
with a great potential for success; however, they recognize that such acti-
16
vities can be burdensome and impose a heavy drain on an organization whose
goals are service delivery. The dilemma for some CAAs is, then, how does
a CAP maintain the "integrity" of the community action movement and still
have enough resources left for economic development activity? We may even
speculate that the reason CSA directed economic development monies through
CDCs was the fear that the combination of both social service and economic
development program monies in one organization may dilute either purpose and
specifically that misdirected political and advocacy efforts of CAPs may
diffuse economic development goals and resources.
As previously alluded to, CSA has encouraged little national support
for CAAs in economic development or attempted a program for capacity
building by the sharing of past mistakes of CDCs, for instance. CSA has
gone as far as to suggest that CAAs do "what they know best,' 3 and has
not responded to its largest agency/constituent group by developing its own
capability to assist CAAs in the area of community economic development.
The facts of the matter are
- CAAs, because of reduced and rechanelled funding, national program
shifts and uncertainty over future CSA funding, have made efforts
towards self-sufficiency and in so doing have attempted to develop
enterprises independent of CSA support;
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- Results of a survey taken by Communities in Action Together (CAT)
(an advocacy and support group for CAAs) show that although approx-
imately 50% of the CAAs surveyed (102 out of 218 responses) are
involved in "income-generating economic development activity" ( income
generating was not defined by the surveyors), only 15% of the 32
projects are self-sustaining and require no operating subsidy.
- There is scarcely enough Title VII money to meet the burgeoning
. demand ($46.5 million is this fiscal year's allocation).
17
Given the above, a move needs to be made on the national level to assist
and encourage both CAAs and CDCs to develop strategies--working with both
state and local governments--to solve their coordination and cooperation
difficulties. As asserted by John Kearse, in urging a coalition strategy
in order for community economic development to survive:1 5 "The CDCs must
realize that community economic development can only take place if the
daily social needs of the poor are met, and CAPS must recognize the neces-
sity of tackling the basic economic and business realities in their communi-
ties. " 16
Although this thesis is not designed to find a solution to the CAP/CDC
problem, the findings may lead the reader to his own conclusions as to the
viability of each CED model as a means of achieving both social and economic
goals. The case study enterprises, for example, happen to both fall within
the two genres and fit close examples of the CDC/CAA models. Therefore,
a close analysis of how the two operations fared may give the reader some
clue not only as to the effectiveness of the individual venture in achieving
its goals, but the necessary ingredients for success and the pitfalls to avoid
in the establishment of and investment in such enterprises and possible
conditions to attach to assure project benefits. Which model is the most
viable and produces the maximum benefits is a subject for a later study and
a much more ambitious research design.
CHAPTER 3:
METHODOLOGY
18
Having decided that a test of effectiveness for community enterprise
projects was necessary, we set out to develop some measures to evaluate
these projects. Some of the criteria are more relevant to enterprises in
the gestation stage and others are more pertinent to ventures in the pre-
feasibility or advanced stages; however, most can be utilized at any point
in time provided the relationship between the stage of the project and the
measure is understood and given the proper weight. (For example, a project
only in the feasibility stage would not be expected to have a "current"
ratio or accounting and budget control mechanisms.)
The criteria generally fall into two broad categories: economic/
financial and social. In the economic/financial category, such common
business indicators as debt to equity and assets/liabilities ratios and the
existence of current financial statements are noted as examples of a reason-
ably healthy fiscal management structure for an enterprise. Other financial
indicators give evidence as to the extent of analysis prior to the venture's
development or its feasibility stages: evidence of some elements of a
Business Development Plan, market research and analysis, and proper legal
and management structures, for instance. Private sector investment seems to
signal the health of a venture as such investments show confidence in the
enterprise's viability, or in some cases--particularly in the absence of
venture financial and technical expertise--is an indication of political
clout. The social indicators give some key as to the value of the enter-
prise from the viewpoint of the community, the society, and the individual
project participant. How well the operation works within its surrounding
organizational environment is as important as an organization's willing
acknowledgement of its strengths and weaknesses.
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Data was gathered from a variety of sources: some had to be intuitively
extrapolated from interviews or estimates given by venture managers in casual
conversations. Other data was readily obtained from examinations of financial
statements, proposals written by the subject organization or Division.of
Employment Security (DES) publications. In most cases, we try to point the
reader or researcher in the direction of potential data sources to maximize
the transferrability of this exercise.
EVALUATION CRITERIA:
Some Definitions
"acid" or
current
ratio
debt to
owner s
equity
ratio
working
capital
This ratio is current liabilities to current
assets is a measure of a venture's ability to
meet its obligations for the current year.
The rule of thumb for enterprises is a 2.0
ratio; however for community-based projects,
a lower ratio (not under 1.0) would be accep-
table as long as the firm can break even.
This ratio of debt to owner's equity (o/e) is
a measure of risk. When owner's equity is
much less than debt, it demonstrates that the
creditors really "own" the business. It also
represents the venture's inability to pay
current costs out of owner's equity, if neces-
sary. There is no rule of thumb measure; how-
ever, it is good to compare ratios over time
and analyze the structure of the debt.
gives an indication of how much cash is avail-
able to meet monthly obligations and what
cash disbursements have been made and for what
purpose. It is calculated by subtracting cur-
rent liabilities from current assets. A nega-
tive cash flow demonstrates a liquidity problem.
The above three measures can be obtained through
examination of current financial position state-
ments which itemize assets, liabilities, owner's
equity and debt.
20
financial
statements
owner's equity
& return to
equity
pro formQs
accounting &
budget control
mechanisms
availability
of
capital
leverage
The availability of up-to-date income statements
(statements of income and expenses and retained
earnings for a specified period) and balance
sheets (statement of a firm's current and fixed
assets and liabilities, owner's equity, and
stock) would reveal some positive aspects of
a venture's fiscal capabilities.
How large this figure and its source gives
some indication as to enterprise ownership.
If the enterprise itself holds much of the
equity, the key to evaluating its return on
equity is not only the percentage or cash
value, but to what use it will be put. In
private enterprise, return on equity is
distributed among owners' with community-based
enterprises, it is returned to the community
in the form of increased benefits--addition
of new or expansion of existing services; as
leverage for housing or land development, etc.
Source: financial position statement (balance
sheet)
show one-year projections of income and
balance sheets (see current financial state-
ments.) These projections must be based on
realistic assumptions, industry data, and
should allow for emergency reserves, non-
productive training time, etc.
These criteria signal a healthy,capable, exper-
ienced organization. For most community eco-
nomic development enterprises, this level of
sophistication has not yet been attained;
but careful observation and questionning of
venture managers can reveal the stage at which
the enterprise is at any point in time.
can be ascertained from area banks, but is most
successfully analyzed by the enterprise's
ability to obtain capital from various public
and private sources once requested. It also
gives some qualitative measure as to how the
project is perceived by foundations and
lending institutions, as to the organization's
reputation, credibility and self-sufficiency
and gives some indication of political clout.
A good indication of private investor confi-
dence in a community-based project is the
amount of private money invested in or loaned
to an enterprise. In the Brightwood Main Street
Revitalization Project, a 4:1 ratio of private
21
grants
consolidation
business
development
plan
surplus
regeneration
legal
structure
to public money was desired; but a more
feasible rule of thumb is 1.72:1 (mean lever-
age on a Special Impact Program Investment).
However, depending upon the type of venture,
the ratio can be much higher. Again, this
measure can be obtained by careful question-
ing of venture managers or examination of
financial statements.
refers to how skillfully the venture managers
work in various public grant monies for various
functional areas. For instance, has every
feasible and possible source been investigated
and applied for? If so, how well have the
grants been utilized in the venture--i.e.,
has every possible usage of the money been
exploited?
A plan that should be completed prior to the
establishment of an enterprise as a statement
of goals and objectives and as an operating .
tool. Such a plan should include a description
of the business, the market for the product or
service, current and pro forma financial and
cash statements and other supporting documents.
(An excellent document that details the elements
of a business plan can be obtained from the
Federal Research Bank in Boston, Urban Affairs
Department.)
Many community economic development projects
promote this goal; however few are able to
retain any surplus for regeneration for
additional projects and/or social services.
If this does occur, it signifies excellent
project health. A healthy retained earnings
figure or a positive income can demonstrate
the prospects for generating this surplus.
Has the venture formed itself under the proper
legal umbrella to be able to qualify for the
right public as well as private money to accom-
plish its stated objectives and functions? For
instance, all of Brightwood activities match
those mandated under the Title VII legislation
(Economic Opportunity Act). If Brightwood had
incorporated as a CDC, it would be eligible
for Title VII as well as CDFC, SBA, EDA, HUD
monies. The Lawyer's Manual (Berkeley Law
Project) is a good data source to determine
legal structure.
.
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Recent poverty and unemployment rates in the
project area are good indications of the
relative socio-economic status of target area
residents;,this will often relate to the
amount of disinvestment in the area. Social
service agencies, census information, and
Division of Employment Security publications
are good data sources.
This criteria is absolutely essential: there
must be low-income representation on con-
trolling Boards, and program personnel with
a "community agenda," and a unified political
organizing force. As stated by Parachini in
the CCED newsletter: "If anything has been
learned from a decade of antipoverty work,
it is that community groups must design their
own strategies to the greatest extent possible
so as to be able to operate without dependence
upon outside factors they cannot control."
Careful questionning of venture managers and
interviews with selected community residents
should ascertain this.
Number of jobs created with, subsidy is an
indication of the venture's self-sufficiency
and financial health and can be ascertained
by persons on the organization's payroll
being paid from revenues. The type of job--
primary (high-wage, skilled) or secondary
(lower or minimum wage, semi- or unskilled) is
important as is the effect of investment, in-
dustry, or job movement from one depressed part
of an area to another. This type of displace-
ment can cause a loss of investment, industry
or jobs to an area which may have a greater
need. Data
Data source: The Division of Employment
Security's "Employment and Earnings" lists
average wages by industry and occupation. A
knowledge of economic theory can assist in
determining investment, industry or job
displacement.
Ideally, the necessary skill levels are
available locally; however, when this is not
the case, this criteria should assess the
prospects of on-the-job training, skills
development and career ladders for personnel
employed in the community economic development
project. (Some CED projects, in order to
maintain financial viability, cannot engage
in OJT because production is more important.)
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Also to be evaluated under this criteria 1)
is whether or not skills learned are transfer-
rable to the larger employment sector (for
upward mobility of program personnel); 2) are
wages competitive or at minimum-wage levels
(jobs at minimum wage levels are not always
good substitutes for transfer payments)--a
look at the industry prospects for improve-
ment or expansion may give a clue to improved
wage levels and upgraded job classifications
for employees; 3) are supportive services
available for the program personnel (often low-
income employees have a myriad number of prob-
lems that can be counseled away or referred
out to a specialized functional agency) so
that they can be as productive as possible?
Again, DES publishes average wage information
and demand for labor projections by industry.
How well the agency has followed through on
its mandated tasks and the agency's present
level and extent of working with other organ-
izations in the past as indicated by these
organizations and groups gives some hint as
to the organization's track record and rela-
tionships with other agencies. Whether or not
public officials and agencies support an
agency's projects can play a key role in their
success or failure. Some indication of this
support may be resources tied in from public
agencies or officials; efforts at coordination
or community agency involvement in plans impac-
ting a target area, for instance.
The ability of an organization's managers to
talk candidly and accurately about the strengths
and weaknesses of the organization during
interviews is an indication of the assessment
capability and health of the venture. For the
knowledge of what is positive and negative
about the operation will enable program personnel
to actively seek to remedy faults and strengthen
the program's good points.
Though not relevant to this particular study,
ventures, the activities of which impact or
are directly related to the environment or
the efficient utilization of energy, should
receive special consideration as.to their
possible effects--positive or negative--on these
two factors: for example; waste recycling for
industrial development or excessive energy
consumption of machinery, or capital equipment
for community-based enterprises.
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The Cases: Selection
The Department of Community Affairs, in addition to being the state's
housing, community development and urban renewal agency, is the state's
coordinating anti-poverty agency, including advocacy,.program development,
technical assistance, and operation of pilot or on-going service delivery
programs. In this capacity, one of the major functions of the Social and
Economic Opportunity Division (SEO), a division of DCA, is to provide
support and technical assistance for CSA-funded Community Action Agencies,
and other such agencies with a community base whose goals involve economic
development. In the spring of 1976, the Division of Social and Economic
Opportunity sponsored a request for proposal for community enterprise
projects in support of community-based economic development. The reauest
was sent to about 60 community-based agencies and community action agencies.
Applications totaled 44 and requests amounted to $955,850--an average of
$21,750 per project. In August of 1976, DCA awarded four grant to total
the $69,000 available; projects funded in the initial DCA/SEO round were
the Montachusetts Opportunity Council (MOC) furniture rehabilitation shop;
the Lynn Economic Opportunity Council's demonstration to produce and test
the feasibility of casement seals (a casement seal is similar to a window
shade but made of heat-reflective plastic and slides into tracks on the
inside of the window) production which is designed to reduce night-time
radiational heat losses; a planning grant for the Brightwood Corporation to
develop new business and expand existing commercial enterprises in Spring-
field; and a grant to perform case studies in order to determine the most
appropriate development and/or organizational mechanisms to accommodate
the development (commercial, industrial, etc.) of the Southwest Corridor
which is controlled by a community land trust. Two of the agencies funded
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were community action agencies and two were community-based corporations;
all are non-profit organizations.
Unlike the Lynn product development test and the Southwest Corridor
land planning grant, the two cases selected--MOC and Brightwood--are
representative samples of CAP agencies and CDCs involved in community
economic development; therefore some of our findings will have a direct
relationship on the controversy involving agencies primarily devoted to
social services entering the economic development arena and community
development agencies established for the express purpose of developing an
area both economically and socially. The cases were selected also because
of the ready availability of materials and the cooperative helpfulness of
enterprise directors who allowed in-depth interviews and readily surrendered
relevant documents that allowed the case studies to be presented in this
level of detail. The availability and cooperation factors also contributed
to the ability to develop the criteria at the depth in which they are
presented. These two Massachusetts cases, however, comprise the extent of
the sample; and we must be careful with generalizations concerning project
viability and feasibility, which should only be made after careful consider-
ation of other factors such as the economic and political environment of
a particular enterprise. However, because the cases can be considered
"representative" or "exemplary," some general statements can be safely
inferred from comparative analysis of the data.
CHAPTER 4:
MOC FURNITURE
REHABILITATION PLANT
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The Montachusetts Opportunity Council,
rfie Inc., Furniture Rehabilitation Project,Profil
a 20,000 sq.ft. facility located in
Fitchburg, was established to renovate
furniture on a volume basis for institutions such as schools, hospitals,
and other non-profit agencies and organizations. The Rehab Shop incorp-
orates the following five functions into its operation: stripping, sand-
ing, upholstering, spraying and finishing of furniture, using skiIled
craftsmen and CETA work experience personnel as labor. The goals of this
project involve the creation of permanent, self-sustaining jobs and train-
ing opportunities for the area's unemployed. Other goals include the
extension of various MOC social services, and the liquidation of the or-
ganization's debt and its eventual operation with an excess of income over
expenditures. In July of 1976, the project was the recipient of a $20,000
grant from the Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs (in two
$10,000 payments) for purposes of .subsidizing the operation in order to
stabilize it and help it gain self-sufficiency.
MOC is the officially designated anti-
Project poverty agency for a ten-town area in
History northern Worcester County. Since no
other community action agencies have
a common boundary with MOC except on the west, this agency has made a
practice of serving people from a much larger area. MOC administers a
number of social service programs through its delegate agencies: Head
Start, Community Food & Nutrition, Winterization, Summer Recreation, Food
Stamps, and Elderly Nutrition, to cite a few of the major programs. The
Rehab Shop became operational in February of 1976 with limited production;
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and with the installation of all tooling and equipment, full production
capability was achieved by June of 1976.
After receiving encouragement from the General Services Administra-
tion (GSA) in Boston with respect to tapping a secure federal market, MOC
began looking for an economic development project to use some surplus equip-
ment and also to take advantage of the CETA Job Opportunities Program.
According to GSA, MOC would be able to bid on their rehab contracts, there-
fore a rehab furniture venture was suggested. One GSA condition was that
the plant had to be operational by the first of January; therefore, space
was quickly rented in December of 1975 and CETA Title X personnel were
hired as a production workforce in January of 1977. MOC soon learned,
however, that the organization could not bid on GSA jobs, because only for-
profit firms were eligible to participate in bidding on GSA contracts since
contract monies were from a "small business set aside" specifically geared
for smaller, for-profit firms. A special waiver was sought, but not
obtained.
Undaunted but not undone, MOC was then faced with the task of seeking
a non-Federal market. A sales force of two was hired in March and within
one month had located approximately $100,000 in contracts, and after six
weeks had sold $200,000 in. contractual services. There seemed to be more
demand then the shop could satisfy, and monthly sales figures were project-
ed to $15,000 per month. By April of 1976, MOC Rehab employed 14 persons,
nine employees of whom were Title X Job Opportunities employees and two
were CETA Work Experience enrollees. Production was in full swing for
most of the summer, and the prospects for the business' viability were
increased. However, orders and work slowed down in the late fall and
early winter. With the end of the Title X program scheduled for January,
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1977, Furniture Rehab Shop began cutting its work force through attrition
in late fall. By January, eleven of 17 Title X employees remained. Three
of these were laid off and two resigned, leaving six who ultimately trans-
ferred to the permanent payroll.
MOC Rehab established a "detailed mar-
Marketing keting plan" and hired two trained
Plan salespersons who set out to canvass
the local and regional market with a
34-page price list and general pricing and customer service policies. An
analysis of the market for their services had its basis in "the unexpected
sales volume and heavy demand already encountered." MOC interpreted the
"prospective backlog of nearly $150,000 in sales for its low-priced quan-
tity rehabilitated furniture as untapped demand--the results of a combina-
tion of factors:
Prices for new furniture have increased substantially
in the last five years, while government and non-profit
organization budgets are feeling' the pinch. School
committees, city offices and social agencies are no
longer in a financial position to acquire new furniture
due to low budgets, but still require desks, chairs,
and other types of furniture in order to continue
providing services, Because of strict budgets, re-
habilitation is the only solution.1 7
MOC further asserted the existence of this market and its capability to
capitalize on that market; citing prevailing economic trends in the
Montachusetts region, MOC expressed "little doubt that the market (would)
be sustained for many years."
The MOC market analysis, therefore, warranted a strategy aimed at
primarily capturing business from schools and other non-profit organiza-
tions. In retrospect, however, the resultant focus on schools proved to
harbor difficulties since the inflow of orders and the scheduling of pro-
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duction became essentially a function of the individual client institution's
budgeting cycle. Additionally, since these budgeting cycles would vary with
each institution, MOC could not rely on a base projection of revenues per
month to finance operating expenses nor could it pace its materials and work-
force requirement needs to meet the demand as it fluctuated. The MOC market
analysis, therefore, should have included a study of institutional procure-
ment procedures and budget cycles so that the venture could be assured a more
continual flow of revenues.
Adequate research by MOC or by a state TA/research entity would have
revealed the seasonal nature of the furniture rehab business, particularly
with heavy reliance on institutions as a prime market. With many schools,
the entire budget cycle must be completed before any new business can be
added or "put on" the budget. According to the sales manager, a number of
persons within institutions are how aware of MOC's operation and are budget-
ing in the future for rehabilitation. With respect to doing business with
state governmental agencies, some budget people in certain agencies are able
to make decisions regarding expenditures for this purpose; however other
agencies give all sorts of red tape reasons why they cannot make those
type of spending allocation decisions. Although MOC has contacted personnel
in Administration and Finance, the state's contracting agency, contractual
issues never get resolved to the point where MOC and the State could conduct
business, most likely due to lack of persistent follow through on the part of
MOC staff and'also lack of clear and concise contractual and procedurement
procedures for small organizations.
A business Development Plan (BDP) is key to
Business
organizational growth and orderly develop-
Plan ment as well as a tool for managerial control.
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MOC lacked a full-blown BDP, due primarily to the way in which the organiza-
tion got started. The MOC.proposal, however, indicated that various ele-
ments of a business plan had been either discussed, thought about, or ad-
dressed in varying levels of detail. For instance, a description of the
proposed venture, its market, location, personnel, and management are all
adequately described and documented in the MOC proposal to DCA. However,
a discussion of possible competition from other area concerns, and certain
financial data was apparently not considered in any kind of detail by MMOC.
Had MOC the time to do some initial research on or had informal discussions
with area competitors regarding how their operation may affect existing
businesses, it would have gleaned much information, including that about
the seasonal nature of the rehab furniture business.
Although MOC has excellent financial statements--income and balance
sheets--other important financial data were not available. The exclusion
of several key elements of a BDP--breakeven analyses and pro forma cash
flow statements, for instance, reflect a basic organizational deficiency
and also a key disadvantage which faced MOC upon first entering the venture.
Breakeven analysis, based upon realistic sales projections, would have pro-
vided MOC with the knowledge of how many units of production or dollars of
revenue at which the venture would be breaking even--neither making a pro-
fit or losing money. This information, along with the knowledge on timing
of monies for labor subsidies and other grants would have helped MOC do a
better job of planning and targeting for realistic expenses. Projections
of cash flow along with the knowledge of the furniture rehab market may
have predicted a cash flow crunch and plans could have been made to apply
for a loan for working capital or early decisions made on whether or not
to enter the furniture rehab business without large subsidies for slow
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periods. A one-year pro forma cash flow provides a kind of operating budget
for many small businesses, and MOC could have also used this tool as a means
of identifying potential problems with meeting operating expenses before
they arose.
In retrospect, the MOC executive director feels that the operation
could have started off smaller, grown at a more modest pace and become lar-
ger over time without the massive subsidies that it had. A business plan
and realistic financial projections would have allowed a kind of phased
growth and development by singling out key factors (net revenues, labor and
other direct costs, accounts payable and other liabilities) that would sig-
nal the organization to hold down costs in particular line items or when
expansion of services or products is particularly appropriate. Without the
availability of large subsidies, the venture would have been planned more
carefully and production capacity built at a-pace more compatible with the
existing market in furniture rehab.
One assumption which was basic to the
Personnel & viability of the enterprise was the
Training availability of CETA work-experience
personnel, which in effect is a subsidy
of labor to the venture. If for some reason, such personnel were not forth-
coming, reasoned Mr. Ed Kepler, Executive Director of MOC, regular trainees
for jobs in the area would always be available to support the MOC project
at minimum wage levels. Always a proponent of enterprises to ultimately
service the .poor in addition to providing jobs for the poor, MOC now feels
that employing the hard-core unemployed in marginal ventures requires mas-
sive subsidies for labor and extensive support services for trainees.
Most of MOC's CETA people were from the Title I-category - young and
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older persons sometimes with personal problems making them very difficult
to work with. Although there were some fairly good workers from CETA, there
were also many previously unemployed people who had poor work habits for a
variety of reasons--some attributable to societal ills, others to people
deficiencies. MOC needed special support services for some of these trainees.
The agency itself could offer the types of support (food stamps, counseling,
consumer education, etc.) available through their other programs, and did
so; however, in terms of the time and staff and the intensity of services
required in order to make trainees fully productive, MOC fell far short
and could have used more specialized support services for trainees.
These persons who for the most part lacked efficiency and had low
productivity often spoke of the work as "mean and dirty, no fun and low
paying." Trainees often thought of the "company" as "big Daddy," a large-
hearted benefactor to which their local CETA office sent them for a short
duration. Because CETA employees are not paid directly by the venture but
through CETA, trainee loyalties were not with MOC, and therefore there is
not that direct employer/employee relationship. MOC tried the "buddy" sys-
tem, but it did not work perhaps because of disinterest on the part of
managers.
Problems also arose with the combination of training and production.
It was difficult to cultivate a good attitude towards work and the correct
atmosphere for productivity when training is combined with production.
Workers are trained in five areas: stripping, sanding, upholstery, spray-
ing and finishing, all by a Title X head trainer. The MOC operation alloni-
ed for a one-month period of on-the-job-training for work-experience per-
sonnel. The MOC proposal states that "trainees are supervised and instruc-
ted simultaneously"; however, in practice, MOC found that when a training
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factor is added productivity was extremely low and therefore had to reduce
the projected amount of units to be completed per month. In addition, MOC
found that personnel who were hired and told they were going to be instruc-
tors wanted to insturct and train -- not to be productive workers as well.
Good managerial personnel were hard to find. The first general manager was
released after five months. A second foreman who was experienced in furni-
ture rehab ran the Shop for a period of time but had to be let go after nine
months because under his management costs became too high and production
was too low to compensate for the increased costs. A third general manager,
formerly the operation's accountant, is now in charge.
The furniture Rehab Shop has been unable to obtain Title II of Title
IV CETA help from the local CETA office. CETA Title I people are available
to the project for work experience. In its attempts to get a better quality
worker, MOC would like to have Title VI CETA personnel and has applied for
such. However, the principal problem is that CETA won't make Title II and
Title IV people available to organizations that are generating revenues--
the income of which must be turned over to CETA as per their regulations.
(Certain CETA titles --i.e. Title X allow an organization to have funds
to hire their own workers.) This is the way in which the Balance of State
Prime Sponsor people interpret the regulation; however, MOC submits that
this ruling should be determined on a case-by-case basis. MOC cannot under-
stand why, if the income that is generated is going to be used to extend
employment, such use cannot be considered exempt from this CETA regulation.
MOC has not pursued the issue; but the state Manpower Affairs has written
a letter requesting an interpretation of this rqling.
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Project goals included establishing the
MOC Furniture Rehab Project as a debt-
Finances free self-sustaining enterprise by the
final quarter of 1976; and it was ex-
pected that this goal would be accomplished with the assistance of a $50,000
grant from NERCOM/CSA and a $20,000 grant from DCA. However, this MOC goal
has not been met despite the subsidies (which fortunately "took the edge off
any pressing threat"); in fact, the operators of the enterprise will be
faced with making a decision by the fall of 1977. Either MOC will recover
over the summer months by generating enough revenue to liquidate past debt
and meet present operating expenses or it will hopefully make enough money
to keep itself operating over the summer and can liquidate its assets to
pay its debt in order to dissolve the project without incurring any addition-
al risk. This state of affairs is the result of a number of factors, some
over which MOC had little or no control:
a) If MOC took any of their projections seriously, they were
grossly misled, due to the inaccuracies in the projections.
They are thus rendered useless as a planning tool. Consider:
Actual* Projected*
Receipts $ 63,188 $100,800
Operating Expenses 113,510 62,116
As can be seen, a more realistic projection of income and
expenses might have saved the organization many problems.
b) MOC estimated that "full production rate of 40 units per
day (would) be reached by the month of September," a rate
which was based upon anticipated capability of the install-
ed tooling and equipment. (These rates established the
*August 1976 - January 1977
35
monthly gross receipts based on 40 units and an average
sales price of $20 per unit, 840 units per 21-day month).
In actuality, however, units completed per day averaged
- 15, according to a MOC spokesperson. Given the combined
problems of low worker productivity, high turnover in
CETA personnel, and managerial difficulties, MOC has done
well to achieve even that present level of production;
however, it is not enough to meet the project goals of
self-sustenance and providing subsidy-free employment
for low-income area residents.
c) MOC has invested in the Rehab shop through intra-agency
loans from its operation. With the present fiscal
crisis, payback of these loans are questionable and
may be achieved only if certain conditions exist:
1) revenues from the MOC operation cover operational
expenses; 2) under the present law, unneeded surplus
is to be turned back to the Government. Title to the
rest may pass to MOC as the holder of surplus equip-
ment at some time in early summer. If this occurs,
and if MOC then determined that they had some furni-
ture they didn't need, they presumably would be free
to sell it to help liquidate its debt; and 3) the worst
possible situation to occur would be that MDC would
close the operation. At the end of February, the
ratio of current liabilities to current assets is
2:1 (current liabilities are $50,559 and current
assets are $26,992, not including Work in Process)
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which indicates that MOC may have to absorb some of
the liquidating expenses if there are not sufficient
funds to do so. MOC has indicated that it can absorb
perhaps up to $15,000 of this debt if necessary.
However, the likelihood of MOC successfully liquidating
its debt decreases with each month that there is an
operating loss.
d) MOC has has to "juggle" and play around with CETA slots
with MOC-paid personnel; and in its attempts to get qual-
ity managerial and production help, it has had to incur
unexpected labor costs. Yet despite various public sec-
tor subsidies (including DCA, NERCOM/CSA, and Title X
CETA labor grants) in the period between December 1976
and February 1977, payroll, direct labor, operating
expenses and other costs were 36% over and above income
in the form of subsidies and sales. Clearly, labor costs-
costs MOC assumed it would not incur--were vastly under-
calculated.
As of April 8, 1977, there are six persons on staff who are paid directly
by MOC itself--there are no subsidies forthcoming and as of May, 1977, 12
CETA work-experience enrollees have joined the staff in preparation for the
heavy season. MOC Rehab is trying very hard to control costs and increase
production; and is considering the following to help upgrade the venture:
(1) addition of a time-saving, efficiency-oriented stripping machine that
will perform the "dirtiest job in the shop" and free up personnel to do
other jobs; MOC asserts the addition of this machine will not cause a re-
duction in employment; (2) year-round marketing and more aggressive market-
ing in the slower season; (3) maintenance of a small, manageable core staff
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and the subcontracting out for specialty overflow work such as upholstering;
this would keep MOC from having to hire a craftsmen who would not be kept
busy all the time but yet provide work for some smaller specialty shop and
perhaps help keep them in business.
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The Brightwood neighborhood, with a population
j r u . of approximately 4,000, is located in the North
End of Springfield. It is an isolated community,
bounded by the Connecticut River, the Chicopee
city line, 1-91 and the Boston and~aine Railroad tracts. Since 1974, the
Brightwood Corporation, a local development corporation, has been working
to improve the economic conditions of the residents and business in the
North End of Springfield.
The organization proposed to use DCA Community Enterprise Project
funds to develop an incentive package to enhance or expand existing
neighborhood businesses and attract other needed retail development.
Brightwood, currently operates a shopping center and is concerned with
the improvement of the neigborhood's business conditions, which they feel
is essential to achieve and maintain retail commercial viability and thus
the neighborhood's preservation and stabilization. Brightwood is a comm-
unity development corporation with community resident participation both
as stockholders and members of the Board; it also has local-agency re-
presentation on its board.
Some of the projects undertaken by the Corporation (see Organization
chart) include the Chores program which provides services to the elderly,
the development of the Brightwood Shopping Center on Plaitnfield Street
and the CETA program for which Brightwood Corporation acts as recruiter
and advocate. The Corporation responded to DCA's request for proposal
by presenting two projects: (1) a feasibility study for development of
parcel of land for which the corporation held the designation of "pre-
ferred developer", and (2) the revitalization of retail activity along
Main Street in the North End of Springfield. DCA chose the latter
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project and granted it $15,000. Although this case study is an evaluation
of the commercial revitalization effort, it is appxopriate to look at
other activities of the Brightwood Corporation (the shopping center, in
particular) as a replicable CED model; therefore, a brief section on the
commercial center activity is included.
The Shopping Center
P o cThe North End of Springfield has long been one
of the most economically and socially disadvan-
History tagedsections of the city. In 1963 an Urban
Renewal Plan was developed for Brightwood in
order to stem the physical deterioration of the neighborhood. The growth
of social, community development and economic development programs in
Springfield's North End is in great measure linked to this urban renewal
project. Many of the programs received their initial impetus through
funds supplied by the local renewal agency in an innovative attempt to
develop services which would complement physical programs carried out
under traditional urban renewal.
Central to Brightwood's renewal plan was the development of a com-
mercial site within Brightwood. This was essential since the buildings
containing commercial services for the neighborhood were slated for demo-
lition. With the elimination of retail grocery facilities, food services
became the highest priority of area residents. Because of the area's
isolation, its limited market, the low-income level residents, and the
reduced population, difficulties were encountered in attracting a private
commercial developer to Brightwood. Housing developers were also having
difficulties renting units because of the lack of convenience food stores
in the area. Therefore pressure was brought to bear by the city and
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developers on the community to approve a location for a shopping center.
As part of the original Springfield Redevelopment Authority (SRA)
contract to develop social and supportive services in Brigitwood, the
Community Council of Greater Springfield contracted with the Chamber of
Commerce to establish an Economic Development Office to deal with problems
of employment, consumer and credit information and counseling, and busi-
ness development. An Economic Development Committee composed of Bright-
wood residents and Chamber advisors was formed, and in November, 1972,
this committee was given policy direction of the Economic Development
Office. In response to the problem of attracting a commercial developer
to Brightwood, the Economic Development Committee proposed the establish-
ment of a local development corporation to construct and own a small
shopping center. The Brightwood Corporation was formed for this purpose
in January, 1973; and in April, 1974, the Brightwood Corporation was
named by the SRA as preferred developer for the Brightwood Shopping Center.
Upon being named preferred developer, Brightwood Corporation and the
Economic Development Committee began examining financing and design alter-
natives. After several compromises, plans were accepted by the SRA
for a ten thousand square foot shopping center which would contain a
full-service grocery store, a drug store, a laundromat, and a credit union.
A neighborhood cooperative market was formed and identified as the prime
tenant. After many delays, the shopping center was partially completed
in March of 1976.
Main Street Commercial Revitalization
Project Because Brightwood sees itself as the lead
History agency for CED activity in the North End of
Springfield, it is actively promoting economic
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development along the North Main Street Retail strip with efforts under
the DCA Community Enterprise Project Grant for $15,000.
The research component of the project include a census and consumer
survey of a sample of residents of the Memorial Square and Brightwood
areas. The survey was designed to provide the Corporation and those
businesses involved in the project with an assessment of the consumer
needs of area residents. Based on this information, a determination of
improvements in the quality and type of businesses and services (new and/
or existing) providing along North Main Street was made.
Five new or existing businesses will be selected to participate in'
the business improvement component of the project. Each business select-
ed will be awarded grant monies to improve an existing business or begin
.a new one by renovating a deteriorated facade, investing in inventory or
attractive display cases, and so on. For each of the five businesses
selected a grant of $1,140 will be given to defray the cost of labor and
materials necessary for remodeling or renovation. Hopefully these funds
will leverage larger private investment.
Upon receipt of the completed applications, project partcipants will
be selected by a committee of the Board of the Corporation based on eli-
gibility guidelines.
In order to reach the overall goal of the re-
Retail vitalization of retail activity along Main
Revitalization Street, the Corporation identified four re-
quired sub-goals: (1) an analysis of the de-
mand for commercial services in the areaz (2) an assessment of the potent-
ial for expansion and improvement of existing commercial services; (3)
development and offer of incentives to appropriate new ventures; and (4)
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the preparation of financing and develop feasibi1ity plan for a minimum
of five businesses along Main Street. Although slightly behind schedule,
the Corporation staff has been enthusiastically implementing the revitali-
zatio'n project activities. A survey written in both English and Spanish
was taken of a 12% random sample of North End households. Interviewers
had little difficulty obtaining access and information from residents
since Brightwood and other community groups had widely publicized the
survey and its purpose. However, some information dealing with household
income was not divulged to interviewers. The National Center for Urban
Ethnic Affiars is providing technical assistance (TA) to the effort by
tabulating and analyzing the data. Unfortunately, as of this writing only
an initial compilation of survey results is available, as the Center deter-
mined that a substantial amount of cross checking of data will be necessary
before any valid conclusions can be made, particularly for questions where
there were not many respondents. Results of initial survey compilation
demonstrate that 31% of North End residents have no transportation (public
transportation is very poor in the area) and are therefore "locked" into
neighborhood purchasing. In Brightwood, 76.6% of the households utilize
neighborhood facilities. Additionally, 49% of the monies in the area
spent for groceries were spent in the North End area, and a full-service
grocery store turned out to be the highest priority as expressed by comm-
unity residents.
Brightwood assessed the potential for expansion and improvement
of existing commerical services in a meeting with the businessmen of the
North End in early October, 1976 at which a variety of problems common to
Main Street businesses were identified and discussed. Subsequently, each
shop along North Main Street was visited, an inventory of all shops was
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taken and a listing-compiled'of all services and merchandise available in
stores along North Main Street. This information was consolidated into
directory form. A joint effort on the part of the Brightwood Corporation
and citizen's groups in the North End has produced a stable businessmen's
organization. Largely made up of Spanish-speaking entrepreneurs, the
potential rewards of such an organization include cooperative advertising
and promotion and greater ability to deal with local government for improv-
ed services. For instance, the group is now promoting private investment
by (1) refurbishing store fronts, and (2) asking the City for reduced tax
assessments for retail shopwoners.
The incentive package has been developed and sent out to area business-
men for any five presently established or new retail or profit-making
enterprises that are located or proposing to locate along the North End
of Main Street in Springfield. Grants of $1140 will be given for purposes
of physical rehabilitation--primarily for labor, supplies, and purchases
of equipment, etc. To supplement the grant, the Corporation proposes to
assist the businesses in cooperative purchasing of legal, financial and
design assistance and supply CETA-supported workers, wherever possible.
Guidelines for selectionand prioritizing of project participants include
(1) businesses specializing in a community-expressed (through survey analy-
sis) priority service need; (2) willingness to invest and leverage the
grant with other necessary funds (Brightwood suggests the seed monies be
matched by 20% private sources to result in a 5:1 ratio of grant to pri-
vate monies; (3) willingness to join the neighborhood businessmen's or-
ganization; (4) the applicant's personal income level; and (5) a business
which will foster a growth in employment opportunities--specifically, the
number of new employees hired as a result of the expansion or opening of
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their business. The latter guideline will be difficult to judge, as most
small businesses can run into difficulty when in an expansion mode, and
usually cannot afford new help unless a large increased sales volume
occurs. Generally, a more attractive storefront, increased or upgraded
inventory and physical appearance will not necessarily generate enough
additional revenue for the small business person to expand employment,
but may allow him/her to break even or earn a more.decent living commen-
surate with his/her efforts. After the selection of project participants,
the Brightwood Corporation will assist them in preparation of financing
and development feasibility plans.
Initial response to the Brightwood RFP demonstrates an interest on'
the part of area businessmen to expand and improve existing services. The
following table summarizes eight profiles of North Main Street businessmen
or potential entrepreneurs who were respondents to the Brightwood RFP:
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Type of Commercial Ac tivity Project Description Amount of Investment
(above grant)
- luncheonette
- pool & recreation
center (new)
- record shop
refurbish facade, broken
window; redecorate interior;
replace and renew furniture,
some equipment
building fire damaged;
extensive interior rehab;
front work-signs, windows,
etc.
redecorate interior;
minor facade equipment,
etc.
- clothing store -
boutique (new) rehab of store space;
inventory, equipment,
etc.
not given
- housing
- cafe & restaurant
- general store
- drug store
housing rehab - not under
project guidelines but
will be advised re: other
source of funds
new facade; improve kitchen
facilities
new display cases, light
fixtures, doors. sink &
repairs
installation of smoke &
fire detectors to protect
employees, and residents
of apartments above.
TOTAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Ratio Calculation:
21315
6840
private investment
DCA grant monies - 3.3
$2500
4860
685
12,000
8860
1910
2500
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Brightwood anticipated major problems that would impact the feasibi-
lity study--among them a climate unfavorable to .business development.
One of the Brightwood Corporation's tasks was to analyze impediments to
growth of existing businesses. Two of the major impediments, it was learn-
ed, are vandalism to property and safety of the customers--two phenomena
to be expected in low-income neighborhoods where unemployment is high.
Brightwood has not dealt adequately with this question in terms of perhaps
organizing a neighborhood security patrol or other devices and mechanisms
designed to combat excessive crime in the commercial area along North
Main Street. The Corporation has the skills to organizations with respect
to this issue.
Another major impediment is a tenant's unwillingness to invest in a
commercial property he doesn't own. Along these lines, the Corporation
intends to work with the building owner to try to negotiate assistance
for the tenant in improving his business.
Development
The The need for a shopping center.was established
Shopping after the formation of an Economic Development
Committee composed of Brightwood residents andCenter c
Chamber of Commerce advisors. They noted that
proprietors were leaving the area due to urban renewal and other factors,
and residents had strongly expressed their need for a centrally-located,
full-line grocery store. The Brightwood area, it was argued, could serve
a larger market and would help the community obtain the convenience store
it so desperately needed. For three years attempts were made to find a
convenience store franchise or private enterpreneur to be prime tenant
and lease space in theproposed center. Because of the relative isolation
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of the area, and the socio-economic characteristics of the population, a
private commercial developer could not be found. Thus the Brightwood
Corporation named the Cooperative Food Market as prime tenant in the shopp-
ing center.
The actual development of the Shopping Center is a classic example
of the struggles of community economic development enterprises. There
were financial difficulties: the Corporation had no staff or budget;
each tenant was under capitalized--no working capital was available
since it was spent on inventory and equipment and unexpected expenditures
before the C ter opened. The construction got bogged down: overruns
occurred because unexpected change orders were necessary to meet health
department requirements; and additional plans had to be developed for the
retail market's compressor unit, because the Cooperative purchased the
wrong type of equipment. No assistance was forthcoming from any organiza-
tion during this time, with the exception of a $20,000 loan from
equipment from the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs. Despite the
obstacles, the shopping center opened partially in March of 1976 with the
Cooperative Market as lead tenant and Casa Credit Union, Leonard's Drug
Store, and Ramon's Laundromat as other tenants. Technical experts will
be brought in for three weeks to assess the progress of the Center; this
time, the neighborhood councils, feeling more confident about their role
and understanding of the enterprise, and what they should be doing of the
enterprise, plan to carefully question the consultants and will assist
in the determination of the study's validity.
For the development of the Brightwood Commer-
Finances cial Center, capitalization of the Corporation
has come from several sources. These sources
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include sale of common stock to neighborhood residen'ts; a perferred stock
purchase by Memorial Development Corporation, a quasi-public investment
fund for the purpose of stimulating economic development in low-income
neighborhoods; a grant and loan from a private foundation; administration
of sponsored programs; and loans from local banks and the Small Business
Administration. They are outlined as follows:
Capitalization:
1. From Sale of Stock 43 shareholders @ $5.00 each $ 215
2. From Sale of Preferred Stock to Memorial Development
Corporation 39,100
3. Grant from Raskob Foundation 1,000
4. No-interest loan from Raskob Foundation 4,000
5. Administration of Programs 8,000
6. Loan from Springfield Institution for Savings,
Community and Hampden Savings Banks 102,000
7. Loan from Small Business Administration 266,900
Total to date (April, 1976) $421,215
In addition, Brightwood Corporation is seeking to develop further
capital by offering 12,500 shares of Common Stock at $5.00 each, generat-
ing $52,500 in additional funds. The first share held by any individual
are voting shares and all subsequent shares shall be non-voting. No
individual is allowed to own more than 20% of the shares at any given time.
Through these conditions, the Corporation wishes to encourage the maximum
number of $5 investor/owners. Although anyone is allowed to purchase shares.
the Corporation will concentrate its sales efforts in the North End of
Springfield. However, in its efforts to develop further capital and better
the capital position of the Corporation, Brightwood has encountered'diffi-
culties with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Corporation
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had to prepare a prospectus for SEC including up-to-date financial state-
ments audited and signed off by a certified Public Accountant' (CPA).
Despite the fact that all of Brightwbod Corporation's subsidiaries (see
Organization chart) are regularly audited, the CPA would not sign an
audit for less than $2,000--a sum which the Corporation just did not have
on hand. Brightwood applied to SEC for a waiver some time ago in order
to continue selling the $5 shares but they are still awaiting a response
from SEC--despite the fact they've contacted their state representative
for assistance.
Regarding the sale of stocks, the Corporation's executive director
was asked whether their policy (one vote per any number of shares for
neighborhood residents) would encourage board ownership but limit the
neighborhood voice; Brightwood, it was noted, operates like a cooperative
and decisions are made cooperatively. Although there is no formalized
effective rate of return for neighborhood residents, any profits that are
made can be returned to the community through distribution of a dividend
authorized by the shareholders. Most importantly, benefits are returned
to the community in the form of a viable environment that encourages
neighborhood preservation and stability. Memorial Development Corpora-
tion, the largest shareholdersin the Corporation, has no vote at all; the
Memorial Square Citizens' Council, aneighborhood-based organization, has
three members on the Brightwood Board of Directors, however.
Stock ownership has levered private sector loans. A consortium of
banks stepped in and loaned the Corporation 20% of construction costs due
to an SBA ruling which started that the square footage of the Credit Union
could not be included in the construction loan because it was a Cooperative.
On its loan to the Corporation, the Memorial Development Corporation granted
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a three-year moratorium on Interest payments, with payments accruing at
the rate of 6% thereafter; additionally the Memorial Development Corpora-
tion 's generous terms include a ten-year payback period. The Corporation
has applied for public sector loans and grants--they were turned down for
Title VII CDC funds due to what they feel was a badly-written proposal.
The Brightwood project has been the recipient
Technical of well-intended but grossly misguided techni-
Assistance cal assistance from a variety of sources. The
Pioneer Valley MESBIC, for instance, projected
revenues from the center's laundromat at $59,000 a year based on 96% usage;
in actuality the figure was close to $17,000, which made the venture un-
profitable for any private entrepreneur. In the setting up of the food
coop market, the Corporation sought "expert" advice on freezer equipment
from a variety of professionals and was burned again by making a purchase
of faulty equipment which deteriorated so badly that an alarm had to be
wired to the executive director's home to alert her when the temperature
in the freezer either rose above or dropped below normal so that she could
marshall the necessary resources to save the food from spoilage! Here
are classic examples of community groups accepting at face value the
"sacred" words of consultants or so-called experts. Brightwood tried to
avoid this by layering the assistance such that each subsequent layer
would act as a check on the other; they soon learned the naivete of this
idea. The problem still remains, however, that in order for a community
to be able to use experts, it must ask the right questions which in itself
often necessitates some expertise or access to it. One solution that would
revolutionize the consulting industry deals with making the experts ac-
countable for the advice and services they offer, and tie payment of ser-
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vices in with desired results, in a reasonable manner, of course.
Students and CETA workers are employed in all
Personnel of the Brightwood Corporation 
ventures as
well as expdrienced department heads and
managers. Practically everyone had to be
trained on the job, however, since little exDertise in the area of retail
management was available. Even with the commercial revitalization project,
interviewers were specially trained by Brightwood Corporation staff, the
Chairman of the Community Leadership and Development Department of Spring-
field College and staff of the National Center on Urban Ethnic Affairs.
One problem the Corporation consistently had to deal with was obtain-
ing the proper mix of managerial skills and community sensitivity. One
of the requirements to run the coop market, for instance, was to have these
mix of skills; however, the Cooperation went through five managers who
were not able to deal with community ownership or work with a community
board. Many of these managers were not from the community; however, the
present manager is from the area. Brightwood feels that the most important
point is that managers must have the commitment necessary to keep the
projects going, and this will not be the case unless the individual has a
"community agenda." Nonetheless, this mix of skills is extremely hard
to locate--but the Corporation has been able to find a corporate manager who
seems to embody both of these requirements; she is paid from City block
grant funds.'
In addition, it seems to be necessary to consistently make the staff
aware and remind them of the social goals and objectives of the project--that
the Coop is their store and it is their job to keep it operating. This
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fact is just indicative of how difficult it is to exhort people to think
cooperatively and joint ownership in a society where rugged individualism
and its resultant mentalities are paramount. And it is somewhat surorising
though understandable that, in a strong community environment such as that
which exists in Brightwood, workers would have to be reminded of this
issue as much as seems evident.
The Brightwood Corporation is very active in the neighborhood; in
addition to the following existing developments, the Corooration is
considering other activities. The descriptions that follow represent a
sampling of existing as well as new developments:
Brightwood Corporation operates a laundry
Laundromat in the shopping center. Initially, an
individual entrepreneur operated the venture
as a single proprietorship under the name
of J and C Launderette; however due to errors made by the inexperienced
Brightwood community businessmen and technical business experts, Briehtwood
had to take over the ailing venture. The laundromat got off to a poor
start with underestimated cost and revenue projections made by the Pioneer
Valley MESBIC. The operation covered all costs except labor. As previously
cited, income from the washers and dryers were estimated at the high
level of $59,000, and the costs of changing coin boxes, utility rates, etc.,
were estimated lower than actual. Actual gross income for the operation
was more like $17,000; a student group from the University of Massachusetts,
upon close examination of the MESBIC documents, found that the projections
were based on a 96% usage. This usage rate was unrealistic owing to the
fact that the nearby housing developments had laundromats of their own. It
was not until there were machine malfunctions in these laundromats that the
Brightwood laundry -experienced an increase in revenues; the laundry managers
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have considered advertising campaigns to the possibility of combining
commercial with retail services in attempts to divert business from
competing laundries. (There is an insignificant amount of job and wage
displacement when Brightwood successfully competes.) Once again the
community had been the recipient of poor technical assistance which they
took at face value. The result was a tremendous amount of sacrifice on
the part of residents to hold the venture together and keep the laundry
operating. The laundromat, under the direction of the Brightwood Corporation
now brokers dry cleaning and offers shoe repair in addition to servicing
laundry needs.
Credit Un ion The Casa Credit "nion, the only organization
of its kind in the Brightwood area, was
opened in 1973. It is also the only organization within the Springfield
area giving institutional mortgages in the North End. From within the
neighborhood, Casa has attained a level of $850,000 in deposits, and it
will need approximately $100,000 to be self-supporting. If has been
steadily growing at a rapid pace, such that even the staff is having
problems managing the growth. With over $1 million in credit outstanding,
Casa has financed 23 first mortgages in the Brightwood area. The credit
union has recently looked at earnings and decided to ask nembers- to volun-
tarily reduce the dividend. The members agreed that, in the interests of
the organization, members would settle for a 5 % rate of interest instead
of a 6% rate.
Leonard's Drug Store is the only clearly
profitable venture in the Center--its
experienced entrepreneur was a drugstore manager for many years. The
drugstore has the only liquor license in Brightwood and the remainder of
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the business is solid.
Housin In the North End of Springfield, there is 
a
large (600 families) contingent of families
who earn their living from working at tobacco farms. The Brightwood
Corporation is considering a housing development for these farm families
consisting of 24 units to be built on 4 acres of land granted by the
Springfield Redevelopment Authority. In order to be eligible for the
most beneficial housing and economic development funding, a non-profit
corporation, Brightwood Development Corporation, has been chartered.
The project had not yet been costed out as of this writing; however it
seems as though the land may be either free or paid for at a cost of
$500 per unit. The project will be financed through Farmer's Rome
Administration (FmHA) and Department of Labor (DOL) construction grants.
The Corporation is also purchasing several severely deteriorated but
structurally sound two-family dwelling units in the neighborhood from
the SRA and rehabilitating them for future sale to low-income families.
Land The Corporation has applied for and received
Development a continuing designation of preferred devel-
oper for a land parcel adjacent to the area occupied by the commercial
center. Brightwood is considering feasibility studies including neighbor-
hood surveys to determine the best use of this land-commercial,
residential, open space, etc.
Chors Corp The purpose of the Chores Corporation is
I to provide 'a home-maintenance service for
the elderly of the Springfield area. Chores 'does heavy household cleaning,
grass cutting, leave-raking, painting, small carpentry and numerous
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other home-related tasks. Chores has acquired $10,000 worth of long-
term maintenance contracts during the year., These yearly contracts
have increased the. amount of private income Chores is receiving and
has enabled Chores to operate in its slow season. In the future,
Chores hopes to increase its private contracts to the point where they
comprise a third to a half of Chores' total income. This will make
Chores less dependent upon Home Care and thereby more financially
secure.
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SYNTHESIS
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Introduction
We have now successfully defined community economic development,
given a brief history of past efforts, developed criteria for measuring
"1project success" and documented two exemplary case studies of CED to
evaluate them according to the set of criteria designed specifically
for this effort. It would be most appropriate now to discuss the via-
bility of community economic development--using the case studies as
examples-and make inferences and judgements (albeit subjective at
times) about the value of community economic development as a means to
achieving some stated objective--be it job creation or provision of some
needed product or service. CED will provide benefits to the community,
the society at large, and the project participant, but not entirely
without costs; and the value of the activity depends largely upon its
nature and the economic and social environment within which it operates.
This section will first present the evaluation matrices for the two
projects studies, then analyze the worth of the two enterprises according
to their stated goals and objectives and will conclude with some general
remarks relative to some optimum environment or set of conditions under
which various forms of community economic develoDment activities are
likely to grow and flourish.
EVALUATION MATRICES
Ingredients for Successful Community Economic Development: An Evaluation of 'No Enterprises
This section takes the viewpoint that the state is an investor, investing in community development enterprise, and must
optimize the use of its public dollars for the good of the public. Presented here are some criteria which, I feel,
signal healthy, productive efforts at economic development for communities in depressed areas. Such criteria can be
applied to any community economic development enterprise, but is here applied to the two subject ventures for purposes of
evaluation. In Chapter Three these criteria are outlined in detail and a rationale for each criteria Is presented,
attempting to validate its use as a measure. lore information and background appear in the Synthesis (Chapter Six).
BRIGHTWOOD CORPORATION
MOC MAIN ST. REVITALIZATION SHOPPING CENTER
Economic/Financial Criteria
1. Common Business Indicators
(Quantitative)
- "acid" or current ratio .5 to 1 .85 to 1
(ratio of assets to liabilities) NA
- debt to equity (ownership) ratio debt to retained earnings
2 to 1
- cash flow statements (working capital) none -$1,090 (12/76)
- current financial statements yes until 12/76 available
- owner's equity & return to equity position no owner's equity (o/e) o/e was $39,315, held
by a community develop-
ment corporation and
community residents;
no cash return
(Qualitative Indicators)
- pro forma financial statements yes, but unrealistic no
- use of accounting computers no no
- budgetary control mechanisms not apparent NA lindted staff, but
- efficient office procedures in implementation attempts save been made
2. Other Financial Indicators
- availability of capital bank loan obtained initial indications
are positive
yes; loan from a consor-
tium Of banks
BRIlGiTWOOI) CORPORATION
N1.O MATN ST -rEV TT. r iZ ATION SHOPP ING CENTE R
- leverage; ratio of private to public $ .42 3:1 .34
- extent of grants consolidation good (DCA, CSA, CETA) NA good
Other Elements of a Business Development no; some planning, but yes unknown
Plan financial planning
incomplete
- Market research/analysis/development to inadequate survey; inventory of survey
approximate demand for product, service; existing businesses
an aggressive sales, promotion, plan? yes yes
market sufficient to support operation data misinterpreted
- surplus funds regenerated foradditional
projects and/or social services none not a project goal no; project undercapi-
talized
- proper legal entities (to maximize public questionable; would a CDC NA Brightwood is a LDC and
and private monies) have been a better entity' recently chartered ano-
ther development corp.
Social Indicators
1. Socio-economic characteristics of geo-
graphical area served
- % poverty (updated from 1970 census) in excess of 30% 50% -50%
- % unemployment ' in excess of 12% at least 30% at least 30%
2. Ventures--are they community based? yes yes; merchants are yes
community residents
- % low-income representation one-third CSA low-income two-thirds
representation
- is Board community controlled: one-third strong interagency
representation
- program personnel from community Fitchburg-Leominster yes - North Springfield
target area
3. Job Creation
- # jobs created (with & without subsidy)
and prospects for their continuance
- t pJIdy~~~UL
- prienmary, secon
- investment, industry
six; poor one (part-time)
ary, eLc.) seconUaLy
displacement effect insignificant (see case no; some businesses are
study) relocating to find a
market
twenty-five; fair-good
primary (mgrs.) &
secondary (CETA and
other workers)
none - services not
previously offered in
area
BRIGIHWD001) CORPOLRATION
MOC MAIN ST. REVITALIZATION SHIOPP ING CENTFR
- probability of target resident employment good good
4. Manpower Training & Development
- necessary skill levels (are they available
locally?)
- prospects for human development (OJT,
skills & career growth and development)
- are skills to be learned transferrable
- wage levels - are they competitive
- supportive service for the hard-core
unemployed - are they available
yes; and untrained worker
were trained in this pro-
ject
good - given the contin-
uation of the project
yes - see case study;
yes - but demand for
jobs is high
some; but specialized
support services referred
out
yes
yes
(asst. proj. dir. being
paid from execu. dir.
salary)
NA
everyone had to be trainet
(even experienced coop
manager)
good - training is avail-
able
yes
minimum wage levels
yes for CETA clients,
and other workers
5. Agency Relationships and Track Record
- past program performance good NA good
- interagency coordination coordinates with many good, except for some
agencies problems with area CAP
- agency and public officials support has had problems with excellent
_ CETA
6. Organizational Strengths (i.e. structure,
reputation, credibility, self-sufficiency)
7. Organizational Weaknesses (i.e., weak commur
ity base, leadership, reputation, etc.)
8. Environmental Considerations (pollution,
density, damage to air, land or sea)
9. Energy Efficiency - prospects for energy
conservation measures to be employed?
satisfied a developed
market; gained consumer
confidence--repeat
business
- lack of hard business
skills; dilution of
social service goals
responsive to community
local merchants needs;
ties to community deter
mine corporate priori-
ties
lack of core staff
---- NOT APPLICABLE TO THIISE PROJECTS----
P A C
, community solidarity,
ability to leverage
private financing &
marshall other resources;
community agenda
lack of administrative,
money & staff; (operation
lack of professionals on
Board; project under-
capi tal ized
01
r
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MOC Rehab, a community-based furniture rehab
MOO enterprise, imposed admirable goals upon it-
Rehabilitation self that will, in all probability, be very
difficult to achieve. A standing committee
of the MOC Board, concerned exclusively with evaluating MOC operations,
has developed several self-evaluation criteria upon which to base the
effectiveness of the enterprise. In this summary I will briefly analyze
MOC strengths and weaknesses, particularly as they relate to the Board
criteria and to the "evaluation matrices" presented in Chapter 3.
The HOC project got its start in an unorthodox manner - it was
essentially created to take advantage of several existing programs.
Although there is nothing wrong with a venture being created for this
purpose, there needs to be much more thought and analysis put into the
social, economic and financial feasibility of any such proposed community
economic development enterprise. There is a great deal of risk involved
in operating smaller-scaled businesses even with the proper feasibility
analysis. When a project involves the inclusion of social goals as well,
there is always the danger that the proliferation of goals and objectives
will become diffused and little may be accomplished. One goal--that of
training the hard-core unemployed, for instance--may predominate or may
take precedence over goals of increased production to generate a surplus,
for instance. In a marginal venture where low productivity workers are
hired to fulfill social objectives, there is always the danger of diluting
either social or economic goals and objectives such that the venture
fails due to its attempts to accomplish too much for too little.
The following summarizes MOC's position with respect to the "evalua-
tion matrices". Also included in the analysis is how MOC stacks up against
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its own self-evaluation criteria from its proposal of April, 1,976 and its
Program Report of September/November, 1976 - see Appendix.
Economic/Financial Criteria
MOC's "acid" ratio (or ratio of assets to liabilities) is .5 which
indicates that for every dollar of current liabilities there is 50( of
current assets. Consequently, in the event the 1OC board chose to
liquidate the venture as of February, 1977, assets would cover only one-
half of the current debt, which would somehow have to be paid or absorbed.
Because there is no "owner's equity" (MOC holds no "equity" in the
strictest sense of the word even though it loaned the venture money at
the outset, rather than investing equity for a future dividend) and no
return on the MOC investment, the venture was not in a position to meet
its goal of "generation of capital for additional new ventures." Monies
for expansion of the existing enterprise of new ventures would have to
come from a net income added to retained earnings (and owners' equity)
and such was not available. Because of the precarious position the ven-
ture is now in, MOC will not have available additional monies "for use in
extending MOC services to low-income people," a MOC goal in April of 1976.
Approximately one year later, it is now clear that the MOC venture has
borrowed monies earmarked for social service purposes which severely
jeopardizes maintenance of the delivery of present as well as future
social services to the low-income person in its target area. Additionally,
according to MOC, it has been estimated that $50-60,000 was saved by 35
non-profit institutions that did business with the project rather than
buying new furniture, However, if 1OC goes out of existence, not only
will these agencies lose MOC services, but many may have to increase their
client loads which will place additional burdens on their service delivery
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if MOC finds itself in a position to provide fewer and lower quality
services to fewer persons due to lack of resources.
The quality of the MOC financial statements improved over time;
however, in order to use these statements effectively, a knowledge of
financial controls and analysis is necessary. HOC had no cash flow
statements; surely an in-depth look at comparative weekly or monthly cash
flow statements would have indicated a cash flow deficiency without the
aid of subsidies. An indication of such a cash flow crisis may have then
precipitated other necessary actions--such as a 60 or 90-day note against
inventory or accounts receivable for working capital. And as previously
indicated, MOC's pro forma financial statements were misleading and un-
realistic, because they were based on production projections approximating
nowhere near reality.
The availability of capital is demonstrated by a $50,000 bank loan
hOC obtained early in the venture's operation; this loan was repaid (to
save on bank interest) with MOC grant (social service) monies. As pre-
viously alluded to, this action severely jeopardizes the viability of
the service delivery should the venture fail. Although investment from
the private sector indicates a level of institutional investor confidence
that cannot be discounted in the financial analysis of the enterprise,
the manner in which the investment was reapid must be viewed as an or-
ganizational weakness.
HOC was successful at consolidating state and federal grants for this
venture; monies from DCA, CSA and CETA; Titles I and X were utilized
along with revenues from services rendered. With respect to the business
plan, however, MOC was very weak in the area of market research and
analysis, as previously cited. For instance, MOC neglected to approximate
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the demand for its service, nor did it judge sufficiently accurately the
market needed to support its operation. In its haste to begin this ven-
ture, moreover, HOC did not entertain the option of alternative legal
entities available for structuring this venture such that it may be
eligible for a number of federal or state programs--CDCs, for example,
who are funded under CSA's Office of .Economic Development and are eligible
for CDFC funding.
Social Indicators
MOC's target area - the Fitchburg-Leominster SMSA -. certainly meet
the criteria for community economic development--poverty is in excess of
30% and over 12% unemployment. The venture has a community base--in the
sense that the MOC board meets the CSA one-third low-income representation
requirement; program personnel are hired from within the community and
C
the probability of target area resident employment is excellent. However,
only six permanent jobs have been created without subsidies and prospects
for the continuance of these jobs are poor, given the fiscal condition of
C
the enterprise. Most of the remaining jobs are non-trainee positions,
which indicates that not many (if any) CETA work-experience personnel got
permanent employment from working in the venture. Many of the jobs were
C.-
secondary with poor prospects of their ever becoming primary; a quick
check of the DES publication, "Employment and Earnings" revealed that as
of February, 1977 the average wage for production workers in the furniture
refinishing (not the exact SIC industry/occupational code but very close)
industry was $6,445, including part-time workers. Additionally, it was
learned from the Fitchburg/Leominster DES office that there is little
call for workers in this field, and that for the entire state there are
191 firms in the refinishing/upholstery industry with a total employment
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of 708. Each firm, then, averages 3.7 workers (no.t including self-
employed) which is an indication of the average firm size, growth of the
industry and the prospects for job upward mobility for project trainees
and the transferrability of these skills learned to the labor market place
at large. It is safe to say that the best way skills can be utilized
outside of MOC Rehab is in an individual venture - perhaps in some spe-
cialty area. One woman who learned the trade of upholstery subsequently
left the MOC project and opened up her own business as an furniture
upholsterer, working from her home. It becomes especially important, then,
for ventures like MOC to become self-sustaining since the probability that
workers and/or trainees-skilled or unskilled-will find related employment
elsewhere is very small given the industry and the economic environment
of the area. However, with the exception of 12 CETA work-experience
trainees, the majority of workers now operating the venture are semi-
professional or skilled craftsmen, making a competitively decent, but
slightly less than market wage. These persons are employable and could
probably obtain work elsewhere, provided the area was not as economically
depressed as is presently.
MOC rarely had problems locating the necessary skill levels locally
as a general depression in the area resulted in an oversupply of available
workers. With the help of CETA, MOC was able to reach its goal of "em-
ploying the unemployed skilled and unskilled workers to help alleviate
the chronic unemployment problem in the area. . ." However, the managerial
capability of even experienced foremen was found to be lacking. And
although on-the-job training and skills orientation was provided, pro-
ductive capacity was often sacrificed to accommodate social goals and
objections. Limited supportive services were available for "problem"
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workers, and HOC tried to build in incentives by planning a job redesign
program which would initiate a management system involving "industrial
democracy" including planning, profit sharing, and equity acquisition
by employees. This effort was initiated to enlist the understanding and
help of the full work force in meeting the crisis situation, but it was
only moderately successful, in all likelihood due to the lack of interest
on the part of supervisory personnel, who were not enthusiastic about
the idea.
There was little displacement of industry or investment. Upon
learning of a small stripping shop in Fitchburg which could do some
surplus work for the project, MOC executives approached the shopowner
with an offer to do some contract work. It was then they learned the
businessman and his wife had been working long hard hours and not making
earnings commensurate with his efforts. MOC subsequently bought out the
business and hired the man as head stripper. This worked out well for
a while; however, in the money crunch, the former shopowner had to be
laid off and his whereabouts are presently unknown to MOC executives at
this time.
MOC has good interagency relationships and has performed well in the
past in its social service functional areas. Organizational strengths
include its track record in social services, access to resources, the
ability to find a market of satisfied customers in an area where some
demand is evidenced as well as creation of a work place designed to employ
skilled and unskilled workers to satisfy this demand. HOC has some nega-
tive qualities, however; it began the venture with little study and
analysis and lacked business skills that hampered its operation as an
efficient productive enterprise. In addition, MOC dangerously threatened
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the continuance of service delivery by "loaning" the venture social
service grant monies.
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For the most part, Brightwood projects are
Brightwood 'well thought out and executed in the most
Corporation feasible manner, given the enormity of some
of the constraints. The corporation, though
plagued with lack of staff and professional Board direction, has been
remarkably able to marshall the resources to provide a vital community
service--despite nearly insurmountable odds. Clearly, certain peculiarities
of the Brightwood project are partially responsible for its apparent success:
The relative isolation of the area from the rest of the city and the actions
of the SRA in its urban renewal activity brought out a sense of community
solidarity which in turn resulted in political clout (against the external
"oppressor," as the SRA was no doubt seen); additionally, the Corporation
had a community-endorsed mandate to carry out most of its plans and programs.
It would benefit us to take a close look at how both the Main Street Revi-
talization operation measures up to our evaluation criteria. Unlike MOC,
Brightwood does not have any self-evaluation criteria by which we can
additionally monitor corporate activity.
Economic and Financial Criteria
Brightwood's "acid" or current ratio indicates that for every $1 of
current liabilities incurred, there is only 85C in current assets - an
insufficient amount to cover current debts. However, the ratio of both
current and fixed assets and liabilities is 1:1 which demonstrates that
should Brightwood have to abandon the commercial center and liquidate its
assets to pay creditors, they would in all likelihood break even. A major
danger signal is the Corporation's negative working capital figure of S-1,090
(current assets minus current liabilities): this demonstrates Brightwood's
inability to meet its cash obligations. The Corporation's board and staff
are well aware of the firm's fiscal position and it is their action that
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led to the request to the SBA to consider refinancing their original loan,
the amount of which caused all the ventures to be undercapitalized. Other
solutions to Brightwood illiquity may be long-term borrowing or accounts
payable financing; however, the corporation must wait for the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) review of the current financial statements
and prospectus for approval of final stock offerings. Equity is held by
the community who (along with the financial institutions and the SBA) are
the "owners" of the enterprise; the community at large holds $215 in equity
and the Memorial Development Corporation -- also a community-based corpora-
tion -- purchased $39,100 in shares for a future return of 6% in the form
of interest payments to begin three years hence. (As such, the Memorial
Development Corporation is not an equity investor in the strictest sense of
the word, but has loaned the Corporation funds by purchasing shares.) The
Corporation lacked pro forma financial statements (which would probably
have been rendered useless anyway due to unforeseen occurrences), and does
not use accounting computers due to lack of staff and money to purchase
such equipment. Budgetary control mechanisms are now being attempted in
the launderette and retail market in order to improve the financial posi-
tion of these two ventures--but again efforts are hampered due to lack of
staff; SBA will give technical assistance in this area by loaning the Cor-
poration some business technicians for a period of three weeks to take an
in-depth look at the operation of the center.
Other Financial Indicators
The availability of capital from non-public sources for the Brightwood
Corporation has been good-- 1% of construction funds raised was obtained in
grants and loans from a private foundation, and nearly one-fourth of the
commercial center construction loan was obtained from a consortia of area
banks. A calculation of the ratio of private to public dollars -- private
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monies leveraged -- indicates, however, that for every public (including
community equity) dollar, there was 34k of private money injected into .the
shopping center project. Although injection of these monies into the proj-
ect displays private investor confidence, this private money is in the form
of burdensome debt financing (with the exception of a $1,000 foundation
grant); meeting these debt service requirements may cause Brightwood future
problems. There are early indications that the grant monies to be allocated
under the Main Street Revitalization project will successfully act as seed
money to lever some personal or institutional finances. Of the eight
profiles obtained from area businessmen and potential entrepreneurs in
response to the Brightwood RFP, a total of $6840 in grant monies will
lever private monies in excess of $21,300 -- which yields a private/public
money ratio of 3:1. Though it doesn't meet the organizations self-imposed
goal of 5:1 ratio, it still demonstrates project strength and viability.
If these projects are selected by the Corporation Board and if each indivi-
dual businessman's financing goes as expected, the Brightwood Corporation
would have assisted in obtaining $3 from private and personal financial
sources for every $1 of grant money DCA had awarded under the Community
Enterprise Project Grant! The corporation is also considering working
with building owners who have tenants interested in rehabilitating their
stores, since often tenants will not make investments in property they don't
own or have any interest in.
As far as we're able to ascertain, the Shopping Center did not have
a business development plan, unlike the North Main Street Revitalization
project--which incorporated some elements of a business plan in its goals,
objectives, and timetables. A business plan prepared in advance may have
alerted project planners to the fact that the Health Department had to ap-
prove shopping center plans prior to construction thereby avoiding any
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potential delays id the development of the commercial center. In the case
of both projects, market research/analysis/development was carried out in
the form of surveys to 1) approximate the demand for both a commercial
center and business revitalization project and 2) to determine whether or
not the market was sufficient enough to support the operation of the ven-
tures. For the launderette, the initial market survey produced by the
Pioneer Valley MESBIC unsuccessfully projected the demand for laundry
services to the extent that the venture came very close to folding and
would have done so had it not been for the community support Brightwood
was able to garner. Unfortunately neither project will generate funds for
additional projects or social services for the following reasons: 1) it is
not a project goal with the Main Street Revitalization Project; and 2) the
Brightwood project was undercapitalized and there is no surplus available
for such regeneration.
Social Indicators
The Brightwood area is severely depressed with 50% poverty (updated
by Brightwood estimates from the 1970 census) and a 30% rate of unemploy-
ment. All Brightwood ventures employ target area residents and are
community-based -- there is low-income Board and agency representation
and community stockholders ($5/share) can vote in corporate matters. Approx-
imately twenty-five jobs have been created by development of the shopping
center and these employees are either CETA workers or full-time paid staff
(no subsidy). One part-time position has been created with DCA funds for
the Main Street Revitalization Project (the individual is presently being
paid out of the Executive Director's salary; a line item change from a
travel account to be a salary account will be requested from DCA for the
assistant Director's salary). Most of the managerial positions are of the
primary type, and many of the secondary positions are either CETA or other
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workers who are paid at minimum wage levels. The average wage in the retail
food industry in Massachusetts is $6,416. There are good prospects of
employment continuity; however, according to industry reviews conducted by
Mary Helen Lorenz 4 he food (wholesale) industry will experience a 15.7%
decline, which has major implications for the retail food industry, the
Cooperative market and the upward mobility or transferrability of trainee
skills to the larger labor market. There is no chance whatsoever that
investment or employment displacement can occur since Brightwood is the
only organization offering these services in the area - thereby filling a
gap and performing a needed community service that was previously nonexis-
tent due to the lack of private investment.
Training had to be provided (primarily on-the-job training) for all
retail market employees since none had experience in retailing food. Even
the original cooperative manager, who had twenty years of experience with
a large supermarket chain, made some categorical errors that cost the
venture additonal money and problems for which they were not equipped to
handle. (For instance. Durchase of the market's faulty equipment was made
from the original coop manager's former employer, a large A & P market.)
The National Center will provide Board, staff, and community training,
provided there is enough interest and demand for these discussion groups.
The Center will additionally work with the staff of the Credit Union to
help them understand their function and role as a community development
credit union. Interviewers with the commercial revitalization project
were specially trained by Brightwood Corporation staff, Chairman of the
Community Leader-ship and Development Department of Springfield College and
staff of the National Center. In both projects, therefore, training was
available to upgrade local skills to the required levels, and prospects
for skills and career ladder development will improve as the project
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continues and progresses. Supportive services were made available,
particularly for CETA workers, since the Brightwood Advocacy Team (a
division of the Corporation) is a subgrantee of the Hampden County Man-
power Consortium and administers one-half of the total Springfield CETA
program within the North End. A multiplicity of services--including day
care, health, education, transportation, and assistance with housing needs
are made available to CETA as well as non-CETA workers through efforts of
the Advocacy Team.
Except for a few historical problems with the Springfield Action
Commission (the designated CAP agency for the city), the Brightwood Corpora-
tion and its projects have a positive performance record, coordinate reg-
ularly with other community, city and state organizations and have received
widespread agency and public official support. Brightwood Corporation would
not have had the success it can claim without the support of the community
or the many agencies in the city. For instance, the SRA is assisting the
Corporation in land and housing development: it has assigned four acres
to the Corporation for housing development; and with the open space manage-
ment plan that Brightwood is considering, the SRA will assist in plans to
develop the land and sell the land to the Corporation for 10c a square foot.
An architect has volunteered his services for this project. The City of
Springfield has funded the Brightwood executive director's salary for one year
through local options funds (the City and the Brightwood Corporation Board
are considering a new arrangement where the Corporation could expand its
paid staff with City funds in return for a small percentage (10%) of the
executive director's time for other city development projects.) The Spring-
field Housing Authority cleared land for the Corporation for its proposed
farm housing development; the Chamber of Commerce has provided ongoing
technical assistance to Brightwood efforts; the City's Bicentennial Commit-
tee will assist in beautification projects; and finally the Governor of
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Massachusetts, on a recent field trip to the shopping center site, granted
the Corporation $7400 for new freezer equipment--just to cite some of the
agency and individual assistance the Corporation has received.
.Brightwood's organizational strengths are (1) its community solidar-
ity: despite differences, the conflicts are resolved and negotiated to the
point where developments have been able to proceed at a steady pace; (2) po-
litical clout: its ability to lever private funding and marshall other
public resources--Brightwood had to display some strengths in its structure,
reputation, credibility and self-sufficiency in order to convince potential
financiers of the viability of the commercial center project; and (3) its
community agenda that affects corporate priorities: without such, the
community would not have rallied in support of the various ventures when
they were in trouble; the community realizes the development was by and for
themselves, is responsive to their needs, and have often volunteered commu-
nity labor to keep a venture afloat, when necessary. Lack of core staff
and a operation budget is one of Brightwood's major organization weaknesses,
which may be overcome in the near future (whether or not to the community's
satisfaction remains to be seen); the project was sorely undercapitalized,
which through SBA action may soon be remedied; and since many of the pro-
jects could use professional assessment, the lack of available Board profes-
sionals often hampers the decision-making ability of the Corporation. With
respect to the Main Street Revitalization Project: its strengths are its
responsiveness to the needs of the area residents and local merchants. The
initial conceptualization of the project originated with tabulation of a
survey, one question of which dealt with the reason consumers were not using
the North Main Street shopping area. Selection and quality of stores/ser-
vices and cost of goods were some of the main areas of concern to community
residents, and these are the areas upon which Brightwood chose to focus in
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order to better shopping conditions in the area. One weakness of the
project, however, concerns the eight initial profiles (see pg.45 ) and the
categories of products/services they represent and how they relate to com-
munity-expressed needs. Initial compilation of survey results revealed
that the stores or services which households indicated were most needed
on North Main Street included: 1) a grocery store; 2) a department store,
3) a clothing store, 4) medical offices, and 5) movies. Of the eight pro-
files received thus far, only two businesses relate remotely to those
expressed community priorities--the grocery store, an existing business
that would like to refurbish its interior; and the boutique '- a new busi-
ness slated to carry men's and women's casual wear and accessories that
would like to rehab store space and purchase necessary inventory and equip-
ment. It may be that the services that are really needed cannot be handled
by community entrepreneurs; this should put Brightwood Corporation in the
role of advocate/market agents for the neighborhood by attempting to attract
those enterprises and professionals into the area to provide services in
which a majority of community residents have expressed an interest.
Despite the many problems, the activities of the Brightwood Corpora-
tion are ongoing and providing a much needed service to the community. The
neighborhood development corporation, cooperative market, and credit union
are excellent models of neighborhood ownership and control, and present
viable means to effective community development.
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Conclusions
Community economic development ventures are established for a myriad
number of reasons--among them are the goals of community control of local
institutions, the creation of jobs in impoverished -areas, the provision of
needed goods or services, or the creation of opportunities for the poor
and minorities to participate in the economic mainstream. It then becomes
necessary to try to judge the effectiveness of community enterprise as
a method to achieve any one or all of these stated goals, given the reality
of a limited amount of resources to allocate. We will therefore attempt,
in this section, to draw some conclusions about the viability of CED
enterprises in general and the case study ventures in particular. In the
process of doing this study, we began by assuming that all CED enterprises
were basically the same and that what applied to one would be relevant to
another. However, we soon discovered a typology of CED enterprises--of
which the two case studies are representative samples; and in this section
we will attempt to assist anyone interested in making community economic
development investment decisions by drawing conclusions and a few recom-
mendations for any technical assistance needed by these ventures based
on this typology.
First, what is the value of a community enterprise to a community to
which the venture responds? For the community to benefit from enterprise
activity, a product or service should be provided that will not be under-
taken by the private sector. (In some cases, I feel, a community enter-
prise can and should feel comfortable with openly competing with the
private sector to provide some'good or service if, through skillful manage-
ment and leverage of private capital, grants consolidation, a quality good
or service can be provided at a lower cost for the benefit of consumers in
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the low-income neighborhood.) The North End of Springfield is definitely
benefiting from the development of the shopping center and will benefit
indirectly from the revitalization of' the North Main Street commercial
area in the form of better quality goods, consumer amenities, and stabili-
zation of the neighborhood. There are no direct benefits to the "community"
from the MOC enterprise, in terms of service provision; institutional
savings from rehabing rather than replacing furniture are not often
passed through in the form of savings to consumers of institutional services
in the form of reduced costs for services--such savings would most likely
be spent on administrative expenditures.
A community can also benefit through increased employment and
creation of a workplace where none previously existed, If job creation is
a project goal, then the value of the enterprise to the community is the
number of previously unemployed workers who are able to obtain permanent
jobs from creation of the enterprise. In both cases--MOC and Brightwood--
jobs were created; however, the degree of permanency of work in the MOC
rehab project is questionnable as is the cost of the workplace when compared
to the amount of permanent jobs created. Not including CETA workers, the
cost in both public and private dollars to create and keep six permanent
and an average of 9 CETA workers approximates $11,250; and with Bright-
wood's 25 CETA and other employees, the cost per job created is nearly
$16,000. The question can then be asked: Is this the most efficient use
of resources or the most efficient manner in which to achieve a job creation
goal? For Brightwood, the high cost per job is somewhat justified because
other goals of service provision and opportunity creation are being
achieved; contrastly, goals of direct service provision or opportunity
creation to the community at large are not really met by the MOC project--
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even though an early MOC goal was to achieve a surplus revenue to begin
rehabilitating the furniture of low-income residents in the target area.
If project goals involved the creation of opportunities for poor and/or
minority participation in the economic mainstream, project costs would
still be an important factor; and although some projects can achieve this
goal better than others and at a more minimal cost, MOC and Brightwood
would both pass the test.
Finally the community benefits by being able to boast trained workers
as a resource it can utilize primarily to export labor in return for a wage
which can then be spent in the community. It does liitle good, however, to
have trained workers in areas where labor surpluses occur or in declining
non-growth industries; training workers for non-existent jobs (should be
community enterprise fail) would cause an increase in the unemployment rolls
and a resultant decline in neighborhood stability. Both MOC Rehab and the
Brightwood project are guilty of training workers in secondary, low-
skilled jobs with little prospects for upward mobility. An argument can
be made, however, to justify this.action: Such semi- and unskilled
workers are moving from no job to a (for some their first) job with relative
ease of entry. From this job they may cultivate work habits that would
assist them in attempts to enter.the larger labor market in search of
further training or related employment. It can also be said that
employment (be the jobs primary or secondary) helps create community
stability which in turn aids in neighborhood preservation, reduction in
crime, etc.; however, this employment stability is based upon enterprise
continuation.
We can next discuss the value of community enterprise to the individual
participant--the enterprise trainee in particular. Assuming a rational
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trainee, his primary concerns are gaining a skill and earning a wage. From
his viewpoint, parti.cipation in the project is only valuable if 1) if pays
off; and 2) he can use his skill elsewhere. For a formerly unemployed
worker, training and employment in a community enterprise brings greater
return than a transfer payment or not having any job at all; and sometimes
even though there is little net increase over previous earnings (transfer
payments or other income), a trainee will recognize the benefit of being
employed, developing good work habits, and of learning a skill. Not every
trainee is capable of evaluating job mobility, but a rational trainee is
interested in selling his skill in the larger labor market and knowing how
far the skill can take him. Therefore, one benefit of community enterprise
to an individual may be the cteation of opportunities where trainees can
use skills in an industry where there are established career ladders and
few barriers to entry or routes to access at various levels. Clearly,
this is extremely difficult due to factors that serve to block trainee
access to jobs in the employment market--education, experience, discrimina-
tion, rates of turnover and attrition, and a slack demand for workers in a
particular field or industry. For MOC trainees, the industry situation is
grim, both for job mobility and earnings payoff because average wages are
at the secondary level, and there are many small (under 10 employees)
firms, which may be an indication of industry weakness. The situation is
not much better at Brightwood, with the low average wage in the retail
food industry and the 15% projected decline in the industry as a whole.
What cannot be discounted, again however, are the benefits of these jobs
as opposed to the alternative of no jobs in terms of development of work
habits, worker satisfaction, community pride and solidarity, and
neighborhood stability.
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A Typology
As previously stated, two general models of CED enterprises have
emerged--one a social service agency dependent upon government funding--
reorienting agency missions and objectives to venture creation and the
other a community development-type organization whose goals are primarily
economic and who must depend upon the private market as well as public
sources for survival. The organizational arrangements for these two
models differ as do the origins from which they sprung: the CAP agency
has long been institutionalized as a part of the antipoverty neighborhood
action scene. These organizations have the CSA-required one-third low-
income Board representation (which is also institutionalized); a secure
funding base and lines of credit with local banks, little "grass-roots"
involvement, and were most often not formed in response to or as a result
of some volatile, emotional local issue. In marked contrast, the Bright-
wood Corporation has no institutional base to speak of, has true "grass-
roots" representation (two-thirds), a strong political base, good inter-
agency cooperation and was organized around an emotional issue--urban
renewal. This fact has tremendous implications for the way each entity
view community enterprise, how it goes about initiating a venture, and what
each needs in order to make a success of attempts at community economic
development.
I would venture to infer that some CAPs view community economic develop-
ment more as entrepreneurial business development because they are attem-
pting to move away from their social service orientation. Decisions to
enter a particular venture most often are not the result of some community-
initiated request or badly-needed service. Rather, a CAP will see an
opportunity to get an "edge" in on a particular market, and try to enter
it and reap the benefits in the name of community enterprise. (In some
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localities, there are CAPs competing against private businesses for food
stamp activity because of the revenue creation potential!) Their goals
or hidden agendas may be to increase agency cash flows or to underwrite
new or expanded social services; however, in their attempts to become more
CED or business oriented, they are in constant danger of losing sight
of their agency mission. Often, the community is not even consulted as
to what venture or service would best meet their needs. The Brightwood
model explicitly infers community consultation before any venture
direction is taken--community surveys, hearings, and constant attendance
at agency board meetings helps Brightwood personnel keep abreast of their
community's needs. This community mandate is what has helped Brightwood
obtain its resources; whereas with MOC, it has had to rely on its rela-
tionships with the local bank (where it regularly deposits its money and
probably has a line of credit) and other public agencies with whom it
does business and administers existing grants. Agencies like MOC, there-
fore, have to display a degree of technical expertise, given their present
level of institutional, sophistication, in order to be able to attract the
resources as well as convince their present funding sources about the
viability of the proposed venture.
TYPOLOGY
Source (mandate, origins)
institutional community
dependent
social CSA day care, health, etc. on public
(MOC) monies
TYPE
economic Model Cities LDCs, CDCs dependent
(CDCs) (Brightwood) on market
The above chart depicts the typology of which we sDeak
and categorizes organizations by mandate and origins.
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On the other hand, the mentality of social service organizations such
as MOC may not be geared sufficiently towards venture creation in a hard
business context, but in the context of helping people; the proper balance
needed for revenue creation, venture permanency, payoff for monies spent,
and social service aggrandizement may be difficult to understand. With
MOC, it was entirely too easy to liquidate bank debt through use of
social service funds; this action demonstrates the difficulties faced by
social service agencies involved in community enterprise. There is a
strong temptation to use existing available programmatic monies when
enterprises are in need of resources. This most compelling concern is
referred to in previously mentioned ideas of maintaining and preventing
the dilution of organizational goals and objectives. We can then
generalize that for social service organizations desiring to create
enterprises, training first in the concepts of community economic
development and in the management of fiscal resources is mandatory and a
necessary ingredient for project success. In addition, technical assis-
tance in the form of project feasibility and a Business Development Plan
is most essential since the enterprise will be viewed by the financial
community purely as a business venture utilizing CETA workers.
MOC, because of its institutional setting and the fact that there is
a continual flow of dollars in and out of the organization was able to
marshall mainly public resources for its venture but not as successfully
as Brightwood. Because of its strong political base and clout, Brightwood
was the recipient of much-needed support from all levels of government,
private foundations and financial institutions and the community residents
themselves. For these grass-roots-type organizations, funding sources tend
to give more guidance and direction in the form of technical assistance,
therefore for Brightwood-type community-based organizations, a necessary
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ingredient for successful enterprise development is a strong community
base and the political clout necessary to get what it wants from the
"1powers that be." Grass-roots-type organizations like Brightwood are more
likely to become involved in long-range economic planning which may include
physical planning, employment creation or social services planning --
largely because they have a more total community focus and perspective than
many CAP agencies. Often, however, whether or not a CAP becomes involved
in overall planning and development for long-range economic and social
impacts is very much a function of the institutional environment in which
the CAP finds itself, the number of organizations "crowding" the field,
available funds, and turf considerations. When CAPs find themselves compe-
5
ting with other organizations, they are hampered in their ability to par-
ticipate or be included in any such planning--nor are they often prepared
to engage themselves in such efforts.
Providing training opportunities for the hard-core unemployed through
CETA programs proved to be trying for organizations in both modes: MOC
had problems with a trainee "big Daddy" attitude towards the enterprise
where trainees were not taking the shop as a serious workplace. Although
Brightwood community residents pitched in and volunteered their labor
whenever asked, workers had to be consistently and constantly reminded
that the shopping center was theirs and was their responsibility. It thus
seems safe to conclude that for both types of agency involvement in CED, a
no-nonsense atmosphere of work should be introduced into the venture and
in community-based organizations, creation of a work environment and
reminders of the "community agenda" will serve to help foster successful
enterprises.
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For investors seeking to know just what organizations to support,
where to put resources, or what conditions for investment are optimum,
a mini-checklist is offered:
a) Understand the institutional setting - if any - and the social,
economic, and political environment of the enterprise (for instance
if investment is to be made in a non-growth industry or occupation,
investors should be prepared to grant massive subsidies to keep the
venture alive thereby preventing a glut on the market of skilled
workers for which there are no jobs);
b) Know in detail what the enterprise is supposed to achieve--what
goals and objectives have been set and by whom;
c) Be certain the proposed (or existing) venture has access to
technical expertise for
- development of a business plan
- market feasibility studies
- - determination of available capital in the area for purposes
of leverage
- determination of the available managerial talent, the necessary
labor pool, and supportive services for trainees, if needed;
d) Learn ,the organizational fiscal structure and insist on financial
analysis training for venture managers prior to the granting of
any funds.
In additional to the criteria listed in Chapter three, potential investors
in community economic development should consider the
1) advantage of investment in human capital;
2) the opportunity cost of each dollar invested - the cost effective-
ness of the. enterprise as compared to other use of resources
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designed to achieve the same goals;
and do their best to promote an environment in which community economic
development can flourish:
- encourage the development of educational workshops and seminars for
organizations presently involved in or seeking involvement in
community enterprise;
- advocate for establishment of agencies to facilitate resources;
broker business and financial assistance; conduct community
organizational training and organizational sessions;
- pressure institutional purchasers of goods and services to
patronize small community-based businesses
and keep in mind that the purpose of these activities, in the words of
19,,
Geoffrey Faux, . . . is owning and operating businesses ~and other
enterprises that will provide employment income and a better life for the
residents of these target areas."
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